Autonomous system
AS9270 APAN-KR-AS National Infomation Society Agency
Education ARIN
Summary
National Information Society Agency (KOREN / APAN-KR)
research education government legacy
AS9270 (APAN-KR-AS) is held by Korea's National Information Society Agency (NIA), the statutory ICT agency that sits under the Ministry of Science and ICT. The AS carries NIA's research-and-education networking, historically the Korean side of APAN (the Asia-Pacific Advanced Network) and the KOREN advanced research testbed network.
What it's used for
This is a national research network, and the routing evidence matches that role rather than any commercial one. It announces 22 IPv4 prefixes totalling roughly 13,568 addresses plus a single IPv6 /32 (2407:c000::/32). The address count is tiny by carrier standards, but the ~21 observed BGP neighbours is high relative to that footprint. That combination — very little address space, many peers — is the fingerprint of an R&E network whose purpose is interconnection: peering with other national research networks, with international R&E exchanges and with regional IXPs so that Korean universities and institutes can reach their counterparts abroad on dedicated paths. An eyeball ISP with 13k addresses would peer with almost nobody; a network that exists to carry science traffic between countries peers with everyone in that community.
Notable
- The prefixes are a mixture of legacy Korean space (
203.255.248.0/21,210.114.88.0/21,61.252.56.0/22) and newer APNIC assignments (45.248.72.0/22,103.22.220.0/22), which is typical of a long-lived R&E operator that has added space in stages. - NIA is a government agency rather than a carrier, so the AS should be read as public-sector research infrastructure, not a service provider.
- APAN itself is a consortium of Asia-Pacific research networks; this AS is the Korean member's routing identity within it, not the consortium's own network.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Hong Kong Internet Exchange | Hong Kong, China | 2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a01a |
Transit providers
7 upstream, 7 downstream and 17 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 11 prefixes · 18.43K addresses IPv6 16 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 27 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS9270- Registry name
- APAN-KR-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1998-01-22
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 24 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9270
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 79% registered · 19 of 24 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 16 naming AS9270
Reputation
Classification and threat
Education University, school or national research and education network.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere