Autonomous system
AS9306 CIETNET RongHua Road No.11, Beijing Economy Technology Development Area, 100176
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
China International Electronic Commerce Center (CIECC)
government enterprise hosting legacy
AS9306 (CIETNET) is held by the China International Electronic Commerce Center (CIECC), a state institution under China's Ministry of Commerce that runs the country's e-commerce and trade-information network. The registry address — RongHua Road No. 11, in the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area — and the associated ec.com.cn domain both point at CIECC.
What it's used for
The routing shape is that of a large single-purpose institutional network, not a commercial ISP. RIS sees only 5 IPv4 prefixes, but 98,304 addresses, announced via just 2 observed BGP neighbours and with no IPv6. Two neighbours is the signature of a network that buys connectivity from a couple of Chinese carriers and originates nothing but its own space; a transit or wholesale operator carrying this much address space would peer with hundreds.
The prefixes themselves are unusually clean: 211.88.0.0/17 and 211.88.128.0/17 cover a full /16, and 210.25.0.0/18 plus 210.25.64.0/18 cover a /17. That is a directly-assigned, aggregated national allocation of the sort handed to state bodies, rather than the accreted scatter of /24s a reseller ends up with. The space backs CIECC's own government trade platforms and the hosting it provides for the ministry's e-commerce systems.
Notable
- CIECC operates as a state-level body directly under the Ministry of Commerce, so this is government infrastructure rather than a private carrier despite the "commerce" in the name.
- Registry records show the space assigned through CNNIC as portable national allocation.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 7 prefixes · 98.30K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 7 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9306- Registry name
- CIETNET
- Abuse contact
- chizeri@ec.com.cn
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2021-11-05
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 60% valid · 3 valid, 2 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 1 authorising AS9306
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 0% registered · 0 of 5 announcements
- Route objects
- 0 naming AS9306
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 446 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere