Autonomous system
AS9294 GNETINC-AS-AP GNET INC.
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
GNET INC.
hosting transit legacy
AS9294 (GNETINC-AS-AP) is held by GNET INC., a hosting and network-services company that markets dedicated servers, IP transit, bandwidth leasing and anti-DDoS from data centres in Hong Kong and Singapore. The registry object gives a United States corporate address while the network itself is operated in Asia-Pacific, so the org is APNIC-registered but US-incorporated.
What it's used for
The inventory is the striking part. AS9294 announces on the order of 334–410 IPv4 prefixes covering roughly 226,048 addresses, and no IPv6 at all, yet only about eight BGP neighbours are observed. That combination is unusual and worth pausing on. A network with a quarter of a million addresses and a broad customer base would normally show a wide peering edge; eight neighbours says this AS sits behind a small number of upstreams and is not itself an interconnection hub, despite advertising IP transit. The space is drawn overwhelmingly from 154.x and 156.x blocks (154.205.64.0/18, 156.239.64.0/18, 156.247.64.0/18 and dozens more), plus 45.197.32.0/19, and it is heavily deaggregated: /18s carved down into long runs of /19s, /20s and /24s. That pattern — a large pool of similar-looking blocks, sliced fine, announced from one origin — is what an address-leasing or bulk-hosting operation produces, and it is not what a facility-based ISP with end customers looks like.
Notable
- The reverse-DNS sample came back empty across the addresses probed, so nothing here tells us what the space actually carries.
- GNET's PeeringDB record lists an open peering policy but no public exchange points and no interconnection facilities, which sits oddly against the "IP transit" and "global network" marketing.
- The gap between the marketing (carrier-grade transit, global backbone) and the inventory (fine-sliced address pools, almost no peers, no v6) is worth keeping in mind before attributing anything seen from this AS.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
7 upstream, 1 downstream and 8 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 81 prefixes · 217K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| US | United States of America | 81 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9294- Registry name
- GNETINC-AS-AP
- Registrant
- GNET INC.
- Abuse contact
- abuse@gnet.cc
- Registered
- 2022-02-11
- Last changed
- 2022-02-11
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 96% valid · 806 valid, 33 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 42 authorising AS9294
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 839 of 839 announcements
- Route objects
- 193 naming AS9294
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 440 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere