Autonomous system
AS9286 KINXIDC-AS-KR KINX
Hosting APNIC NSP
Summary
KINX (IDC / hosting network)
hosting ixp legacy
AS9286 (KINXIDC-AS-KR) is held by KINX Inc., the operator of Korea's carrier-neutral internet exchange. The handle is precise and worth taking at face value: this is KINX's IDC network — its colocation, hosting and cloud business — rather than the exchange fabric itself. An IXP's peering LAN is not a routed AS in the way this one is.
What it's used for
The evidence is that of a substantial data-centre operator. AS9286 announces roughly 174 IPv4 prefixes covering about 263,424 addresses, plus two IPv6 /48s. The address space is dominated by large contiguous blocks — several /18s out of 1.201.0.0, 121.78.0.0, 139.150.128.0 and 203.236.192.0 — with a long tail of /19s, /20s and /24s carved from them. That is a hosting inventory: big blocks acquired wholesale, then subdivided per rack, per tenant and per service. Around 33 observed BGP neighbours is consistent with a carrier-neutral facility where the operator peers with domestic ISPs and content networks directly. Reverse DNS on a sampled address lands on gasan-servers-113.makeshop.co.kr — a Korean e-commerce platform's servers, in a Seoul-district naming scheme — which is exactly what you expect: the space carries tenants, not KINX itself.
Notable
- KINX operates several carrier-neutral IDCs in and around Seoul and runs Korea's neutral IX; it also sells CDN and cloud services, including an OpenStack-based public cloud and a multi-cloud interconnect product.
- Because it is carrier-neutral, tenants here pick their own upstreams, so what appears in this AS is a mix of many independent customers.
- Attribute anything you see here to a KINX customer, not to KINX, unless it is clearly infrastructure.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Korea Internet Neutral Exchange KINX | Seoul, South Korea | 139.150.100.14 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 201 prefixes · 227K addresses IPv6 2 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 203 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9286- Registry name
- KINXIDC-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2002-09-06
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- KINX Transit
- Network type
- NSP
- Scope
- Asia Pacific
- Traffic ratio
- Balanced
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
RADB::AS-KINX-TRANSIT- Present at
- 1 exchanges
- Facilities
- 10 facilities
- Website
- https://www.kinx.net/?lang=en
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0.5% valid · 1 valid, 199 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 1 authorising AS9286
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 90% registered · 180 of 200 announcements 2 other origin
- Route objects
- 164 naming AS9286
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere