Autonomous system
AS9273 SICC-AS ITCENENTEC CO.,LTD.
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
ITCEN ENTEC (formerly Ssangyong Information & Communication)
enterprise hosting legacy
AS9273 (SICC-AS) is held by ITCEN ENTEC Co., Ltd., a Korean systems-integration and IT-services company. The handle preserves the network's older identity: SICC is Ssangyong Information & Communication Corp, the long-running SI firm that was absorbed into the ITCEN group and renamed ITCEN ENTEC in December 2024. This is an IT services house that happens to hold carrier-era address space, not a service provider network.
What it's used for
The routing footprint is unusual in shape. AS9273 announces only four IPv4 prefixes but they cover roughly 76,032 addresses, because one of them is a legacy /16: 203.224.0.0/16. The rest is 203.244.0.0/19, 203.255.240.0/21 and a single 121.138.156.0/24. Just two BGP neighbours are observed. Four prefixes, two upstreams and a very large block is the classic profile of an end-site holder of legacy space, not of a network that sells connectivity — a transit provider would deaggregate for customers and peer widely, and an eyeball ISP would show far more routes. The address space is presumably used across the company's own systems-integration, managed-operations and data-centre work, which is what ITCEN ENTEC's business consists of: building and running information systems for Korean public institutions, education bodies, defence and financial clients.
Notable
- The
/16is legacy KRNIC-era space, allocated when the holder was a much bigger telecom-adjacent player; the small prefix count today shows the network was never re-purposed into a commercial ISP. - The name on the handle is a trap:
SICCdoes not correspond to any organisation currently trading under that name, and the modern operator's brand (ITCEN) appears nowhere in the registry object.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 76.03K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS9273- Registry name
- SICC-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1998-01-22
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 4 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9273
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 75% registered · 3 of 4 announcements
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS9273
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere