asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS9201 SWAF Swedish Armed Forces

Unclassified RIPE Government

IPv4 addresses 70.66K 24 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 7 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly SE
Exchanges 5 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 6 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Swedish Armed Forces (Försvarsmakten)

Sweden · AI-generated

government enterprise legacy

AS9201 (SWAF) is held by the Swedish Armed Forces — Försvarsmakten, the Swedish government authority responsible for the country's military defence. Unusually for a defence ministry, it is a PeeringDB-listed network with a public presence in the routing table.

What it's used for

This is the Armed Forces' internet-facing network: the address space through which the organisation reaches, and is reachable from, the public internet. RIS sees 23 IPv4 prefixes covering 72,704 addresses, 11 IPv6 prefixes, and 17 observed BGP neighbours.

The address inventory is substantial and old. The core is 193.241.0.0-space announced as a set of large blocks — a /18 at 193.241.192.0, another at 193.241.128.0, another at 193.241.64.0, plus /19s at 193.241.32.0 and 193.241.0.0 — which together account for most of the 72k addresses. Around those sit a run of ten 193.182.x.0/23s and a handful of scattered /24s from 192.36, 192.71, 192.121 and 192.165 — the fingerprint of a Swedish organisation that has been on the internet since the era when 192.x blocks were handed out individually. The IPv6 side is four separate /32s (2001:1403::/32 through 2001:1406::/32) plus more-specifics, which is a large IPv6 holding by any standard.

Seventeen neighbours with four upstream carriers is a deliberately resilient posture rather than a commercial one: multiple independent paths to the internet for an organisation that cannot afford a single point of failure, but no transit business behind it.

Notable

  • The AS is listed in PeeringDB, so the Armed Forces maintain public peering relationships as well as paid transit.
  • Multiple diverse upstreams and a large, well-aggregated legacy allocation reflect an operator optimising for availability and independence, not cost.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 5 exchanges in 4 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
LINX LON1London, United Kingdom195.66.225.199
AMS-IX AmsterdamAmsterdam, Netherlands80.249.213.196
Sweden Open Network Internet eXchange StockholmStockholm, Sweden185.1.215.55
Norwegian Internet Exchange Oslo 1Oslo, Norway185.1.55.192
Netnod Sundsvall- GävleSundsvall, Sweden194.68.128.162

Transit providers

6 upstream, 0 downstream and 10 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS12552GlobalConnect AB581
AS1257Tele2 Sverige AB428
AS3301Telia Company AB329
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC326
AS8434Telenor Sverige AB37
AS213241TECHIT.BE SRL11

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-31, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 24 prefixes · 70.66K addresses IPv6 7 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
SESweden31

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS9201
Registry name
SWAF
Registrant
MILSE-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse-fm@mil.se
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2026-10-08
Allocation
allocated

Declared

PeeringDB profile

self-reported
Name
Swedish Armed Forces
Also known as
Forsvarsmakten
Network type
Government
Scope
Europe
Traffic ratio
Mostly Inbound
Peering policy
Selective
IRR as-set
RIPE::AS-SWAF
Present at
21 exchanges
Website
http://mil.se

PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 34 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
35 authorising AS9201
ASPA
5 declared providers
IRR
100% registered · 34 of 34 announcements
Route objects
34 naming AS9201

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 447 networks and 1,845 prefixes, as published 2026-10-31. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check