Autonomous system
AS8867 TEHILA-AS
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
Tehila — Government ICT Authority, Israel
government legacy
Tehila (TEHILA-AS) — the Israeli government's internet network, operated by the Government ICT Authority. Tehila is the long-running e-government infrastructure programme that gives ministries and public bodies their connection to the internet.
What it's used for
- Internet connectivity and hosting for Israeli government offices and authorities: the ministries' public-facing services, intra-governmental traffic, and the citizen-facing portals that today live under the consolidated
gov.ildomain. - Effectively the whole of the AS sits inside a single legacy
147.237.0.0/16registered as the Israeli Government Network, with administrative contacts at the Ministry of Finance in Jerusalem and abuse handling attehila.gov.il.
Notable
- Government address space, not commercial: roughly 5,900 IPv4 addresses across about two dozen
/24s carved out of that one/16, and only a couple of BGP neighbours. It buys transit; it is not in the business of selling it. - Reverse DNS is delegated, but sparsely populated.
237.147.in-addr.arpais delegated todns3.gov.ilplus Akamai (*.akam.net), with SOAblue-egov-grid-master-active.gov.il / hostmaster.tehila.gov.il. Most addresses return no PTR, but the ones that do name government services outright:www.pm.gov.il(Prime Minister's Office),www.environment.gov.il,www.cbs.gov.il(Central Bureau of Statistics),mail.gov.il, and Tehila's own infrastructure (edns.tehila.gov.il,dns2.tehila.gov.il). The rDNS confirms the government use directly — it does not have to be inferred. - The programme dates to the late 1990s, which is consistent with the network holding a low, early-RIPE autonomous system number and a legacy
/16.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-28, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 6 prefixes · 5.89K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| IL | Israel | 6 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS8867- Registry name
- Tehila-AS
- Registrant
- AS8867-MNT
- Abuse contact
- Hostmaster@tehila.gov.il
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2022-07-05
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 24 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 28 authorising AS8867
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 24 of 24 announcements
- Route objects
- 2 naming AS8867
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,849 prefixes, as published 2026-10-29. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere