asn.dev

Routing security

AS8865 ASN-BIAMAN-EDU MSK BIAMAN

Education RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 8 of 8 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 9 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

8 observed

Every prefix observed with AS8865 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
37.128.152.0/21RPKI validIRR55
82.139.128.0/19RPKI validIRR55
82.139.128.0/20RPKI validIRR55
82.139.144.0/23RPKI validIRR55
82.139.152.0/22RPKI validIRR55
82.139.168.0/21RPKI validIRR55
82.139.176.0/21RPKI validIRR55
212.33.64.0/19RPKI validIRR55

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

9 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS8865 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
37.128.152.0/21/21RIPENCC
82.139.128.0/19/19RIPENCC
82.139.128.0/20/20RIPENCC
82.139.144.0/23/23RIPENCC
82.139.152.0/22/22RIPENCC
82.139.168.0/21/21RIPENCC
82.139.176.0/21/21RIPENCC
212.33.64.0/19/19RIPENCC
2a02:1770::/33/33RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

9 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS8865 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a02:1770::/33RIPEBIAMAN IPv6 EDUCKSR1-MNT2015-02-25Not announced
37.128.152.0/21RIPEBIAMAN-DSCKSR1-MNT2015-02-25Announced
82.139.128.0/19RIPEBIAMAN_128_159CKSR1-MNT2015-02-25Announced
82.139.128.0/20RIPEBIAMANCKSR1-MNT2015-02-25Announced
82.139.144.0/23RIPEBIAMANCKSR1-MNT2015-02-25Announced
82.139.152.0/22RIPEBIAMANCKSR1-MNT2015-02-25Announced
82.139.168.0/21RIPEBIAMANCKSR1-MNT2015-02-25Announced
82.139.176.0/21RIPEBIAMANCKSR1-MNT2015-02-25Announced
212.33.64.0/19RIPEBIAMANCKSR1-MNT2015-02-25Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS8865 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CPOPRIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS-IPARTNERSRIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS-PLNETRIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS29414:AS-BIALYSTOK-COM-AMSIXRIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS5550:AS-TASK-1014RIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS5617:AS-AKADEMICKIERIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS5617:AS-PLRIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS5617:AS-SILWEBRIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS8246:AS-PEERINGRIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS8246:AS-TPNETRIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS8865:AS-BIALYSTOKRIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS8865:AS-BIALYSTOK-1011RIPELists AS8865 as a direct member
AS8865:AS-PEERSRIPELists AS8865 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.