Autonomous system
AS8779 INFOCOM-KM KhmelnitskInfocom LTD
Residential RIPE
Summary
KhmelnitskInfocom
isp broadband legacy
INFOCOM-KM is KhmelnitskInfocom LTD, a regional broadband ISP based in Khmelnytskyi, western Ukraine. It trades under the ic.km.ua domain.
What it's used for
Consumer and small-business internet access. The AS announces about 16,900 IPv4 addresses across four prefixes plus one IPv6 prefix, and the reverse DNS is unambiguous subscriber space:
94-230-192-100.pool.ic.km.uaand46-252-208-100.pool.ic.km.ua— generic address-derived names in apool.zone, the standard shape for dynamically assigned customer lines.bras-chika-ae1-0.ic.km.ua— a BRAS (Broadband Remote Access Server), the box that terminates PPPoE/IPoE subscriber sessions. A network with BRASes is by definition selling access to end users.185-15-4-100.pool.fnb.net.ua— a second subscriber pool under a different brand domain, suggesting an absorbed or affiliated local operator.
Notable
- Eight observed BGP neighbours for a network this size: a well-peered regional ISP with several Ukrainian upstreams rather than a single-homed reseller.
- First seen in the routing table in 2002 with
193.201.116.0/23, so this is a genuinely long-lived local operator rather than a recent reissue of the AS number.
Interesting
Ukraine's access market is unusually fragmented — hundreds of city-scale operators like this one, each with its own AS, own fibre and own peering at local exchanges, rather than a handful of national incumbents. The dense peering and the second brand domain in the rDNS are both artefacts of that structure.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-31, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 16.90K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| UA | Ukraine | 5 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8779- Registry name
- INFOCOM-KM
- Registrant
- IC-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@ic.km.ua
- Registered
- 2002-07-03
- Last changed
- 2026-10-09
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 5 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 5 authorising AS8779
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 5 of 5 announcements
- Route objects
- 9 naming AS8779
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 447 networks and 1,843 prefixes, as published 2026-11-01. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere