Autonomous system
AS8544 NSP-INTL Transit AS for PrimeTel AS16229, SpiderNet AS5425 and NetWay AS30916 traffic
Residential RIPE Cable/DSL/ISP
Summary
Primetel PLC (NSP-INTL)
isp legacy
NSP-INTL is held by Primetel PLC, a Cypriot telecoms operator selling fixed broadband, telephony, mobile and TV. The registry description states the AS's job plainly: it is the transit AS for PrimeTel (AS16229), SpiderNet (AS5425) and NetWay (AS30916) traffic — the group's international-transit front door, sitting between those networks and upstreams such as Cogent, Telia, Level 3 and GTT.
What it's used for
Two things at once, and the addresses settle which one dominates. Although the AS exists to carry group transit, the space it originates is overwhelmingly Cypriot subscriber space: cpe-155157.ip.primehome.com, cpe-987528.ip.primehome.com, cpe-864512.ip.primehome.com and so on across every large block sampled. Those are customer-premises equipment records keyed by subscriber ID under PrimeTel's primehome.com broadband zone.
Mixed in are the operator's own routers (j1.lim.prime-tel.net, likely Limassol) and at least one business customer's gear (mikrotik-hq-server.thunderworx.net).
Notable
- A handle that says transit over an inventory that says eyeball. The transit role is real, but it is exercised on behalf of sibling ASNs whose traffic transits here — the addresses under this origin are homes.
- Subscriber-ID-in-hostname rDNS (
cpe-NNNNNN) is a common European broadband pattern and makes the space trivially identifiable as residential access.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 3 exchanges in 3 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| DE-CIX Frankfurt | Frankfurt, Germany | 80.81.194.78 |
| LINX LON1 | London, United Kingdom | 195.66.225.95 |
| DE-CIX Marseille | Marseille, France | 185.1.47.58 |
Transit providers
35 upstream, 15 downstream and 67 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 113 prefixes · 44.29K addresses IPv6 16 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CY | Cyprus | 129 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8544- Registry name
- NSP-INTL
- Registrant
- NSP-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@prime-tel.net
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2026-04-06
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- PrimeTel Telecom
- Network type
- Cable/DSL/ISP
- Scope
- Regional
- Traffic ratio
- Mostly Inbound
- Peering policy
- Selective
- IRR as-set
RIPE::AS-NSP- Present at
- 4 exchanges
- Facilities
- 2 facilities
- Website
- https://primetel.com.cy/en/
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 16% valid · 28 valid, 150 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 28 authorising AS8544
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 98% registered · 174 of 178 announcements 2 other origin
- Route objects
- 104 naming AS8544
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-15. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere