Autonomous system
AS8529 OMANTEL-AS ZOI - Zain Omantel International
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Zain Omantel International (ZOI)
transit isp legacy
OMANTEL-AS is the AS that carries **Omantel's international wholesale
business, now run through Zain Omantel International (ZOI)** — the joint
venture between Kuwait's Zain and Oman's incumbent operator Omantel that
consolidates their international carrier operations.
What it's used for
- Global IP transit and wholesale carriage: ZOI sells connectivity to operators, content networks and data centres across the Middle East and out to the rest of the world over Oman's subsea-cable landings.
- The AS is the transit path for a large share of regional traffic, rather than a network of end users.
Notable
- The defining number here is not the address count — a modest ~14,000 IPv4 addresses — but the peering fan-out: on the order of 1,800 observed BGP neighbours. That ratio, tiny address space and enormous adjacency, is the fingerprint of a transit carrier: it moves other people's routes, it does not number other people's customers.
- The little rDNS that exists is Omantel router naming (
omantel.net.om) plus Akamai cache appliances hosted on-net. There are no subscriber pools; Omantel's Omani retail customers sit on separate ASNs.
Interesting
- Oman's geography is the business case: the country sits beside the Strait of Hormuz on the cable routes between Europe, Africa and Asia, and ZOI's pitch is that it lands more subsea systems than any other operator in the region.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Address space
Summary
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| AE | United Arab Emirates | 21 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8529- Registry name
- OMANTEL-AS
- Registrant
- lir-ae-zainomantel-1-MNT
- Abuse contact
- ip-abuse@zainomantel.com
- Registered
- 2002-04-13
- Last changed
- 2024-12-18
- Status
- active
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere