asn.dev

Routing security

AS8323 CYFRONET-AS2 Metropolitan Area Network Autonomous System

Education RIPE Educational/Research

RPKI valid 71% 5 of 7 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 2 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

7 observed

Every prefix observed with AS8323 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
194.8.45.0/24No ROAIRR47
194.8.46.0/24No ROAIRR47
193.193.64.0/19RPKI validIRR47
195.150.0.0/17RPKI validIRR47
195.150.128.0/18RPKI validIRR47
2001:6d8::/29RPKI validIRR30
2001:6df::/32RPKI validIRR30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS8323 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
185.92.51.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.193.64.0/19/19RIPENCC
195.150.0.0/16/16RIPENCC
195.150.0.0/17/17RIPENCC
195.150.128.0/18/18RIPENCC
2001:6d8::/29/29RIPENCC
2001:6d8::/32/32RIPENCC
2001:6df::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 3 not announced

Route objects naming AS8323 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.92.48.0/22RIPEKRAKPOLIPAS8323-MNT2015-03-18Not announced
185.92.51.0/24RIPEKRAKPOLIPAS8323-MNT2024-07-30Not announced
195.150.0.0/16RIPEKRAKPOLIPAS8323-MNT2001-09-22Not announced
193.193.64.0/19RIPECYFRONETAS8323-MNT2001-09-22Announced
194.8.45.0/24RIPEKRAKPOLIPAS8323-MNT2008-04-30Announced
194.8.46.0/24RIPEKRAKPOLIPAS8323-MNT2001-09-22Announced
195.150.0.0/17RIPEKRAKPOLIPAS8323-MNT2017-02-14Announced
195.150.128.0/18RIPEKRAKPOLIPAS8323-MNT2017-02-14Announced
2001:6d8::/29RIPEACK CYFRONET AGHAS8323-MNT2012-07-27Announced
2001:6df::/32RIPEACK CYFRONET AGHAS8323-MNT2012-07-24Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS8323 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CYFRONETPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-EXATEL-INTRIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS-GTTCUSTRIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS-IPARTNERSRIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS-PLNETRIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS-SUPERMEDIAMANRIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS13293:AS-KRAKOW-COMRIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS196844:AS-KRAKOW-COMRIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS24748:AS-ATMAN6RIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS24748:AS-THINX6RIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS35628:AS-KRAKOW-COMRIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS5617:AS-PLRIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS8267:AS-KRAKOW-1013RIPELists AS8323 as a direct member
AS8323:AS-KRAKOW-COM-AMSIXRIPELists AS8323 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.