asn.dev

Routing security

AS8254 ROUTE95

Hosting RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 16 of 16 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 17 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

16 observed

Every prefix observed with AS8254 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a05:9405::/32RPKI validIRR31
2a06:fcc0:5::/48RPKI validIRR31
2a06:fcc0:6::/48RPKI validIRR31
2a12:6fc3::/32RPKI validIRR31
2a12:6fc4::/32RPKI validIRR31
5.34.178.0/23RPKI validIRR53
46.28.71.0/24RPKI validIRR53
82.117.252.0/23RPKI validIRR53
82.117.254.0/24RPKI validIRR53
85.90.197.0/24RPKI validIRR52
85.90.198.0/24RPKI validIRR53
94.131.16.0/24RPKI validIRR52
94.131.48.0/24RPKI validIRR52
193.238.154.0/24RPKI validIRR53
217.12.194.0/24RPKI validIRR52
217.12.204.0/24RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

17 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS8254 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
5.34.178.0/23/23RIPENCC
46.28.71.0/24/24RIPENCC
82.117.252.0/23/23RIPENCC
82.117.254.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.90.197.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.90.198.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.131.16.0/24/32RIPENCC
94.131.48.0/24/24RIPENCC
156.246.181.0/24/24AFRINIC
193.238.154.0/24/24RIPENCC
217.12.194.0/24/24RIPENCC
217.12.204.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a05:9405::/32/32RIPENCC
2a06:fcc0:5::/48/48RIPENCC
2a06:fcc0:6::/48/48RIPENCC
2a12:6fc3::/32/32RIPENCC
2a12:6fc4::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

18 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS8254 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
46.28.64.0/21RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-03-25Not announced
156.246.181.0/24RADBIT_HOST_BLSYNCMAINT-LARUS2026-08-31Not announced
5.34.178.0/23RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-12-11Announced
46.28.71.0/24RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-06-13Announced
82.117.252.0/23RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-12-11Announced
82.117.254.0/24RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-12-11Announced
85.90.197.0/24RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-06-13Announced
85.90.198.0/24RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-06-13Announced
94.131.16.0/24RIPE—FRIENDHOSTING-MNT2025-06-17Announced
94.131.48.0/24RIPE—FRIENDHOSTING-MNT2026-05-13Announced
193.238.154.0/24RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-12-15Announced
217.12.194.0/24RIPE—GRFL-MNT2026-03-18Announced
217.12.204.0/24RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-06-13Announced
2a05:9405::/32RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-12-11Announced
2a06:fcc0:5::/48RIPE—FRIENDHOSTING-MNT2025-06-17Announced
2a06:fcc0:6::/48RIPE—FRIENDHOSTING-MNT2026-05-13Announced
2a12:6fc3::/32RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-06-13Announced
2a12:6fc4::/32RIPE—GRFL-MNT2025-06-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS8254 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-AVITIRIPELists AS8254 as a direct member
AS-EMPLOTRIPELists AS8254 as a direct member
AS-EMPLOT-COGENTRIPELists AS8254 as a direct member
AS-EMPLOT-RETNRIPELists AS8254 as a direct member
AS-EMPLOTUARIPELists AS8254 as a direct member
AS-ITLNLRIPELists AS8254 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS8254 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS8254 as a direct member
AS-SYNAPSECOMRIPELists AS8254 as a direct member
AS8254:AS-R95-BCNRIPELists AS8254 as a direct member
AS8254:AS-R95-MIARIPELists AS8254 as a direct member
AS8254:AS-R95-SKGRIPELists AS8254 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-18 12:08 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-18. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.