Autonomous system
AS8236 DNA-CE
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
DNA Oyj (customer-edge AS)
legacy
DNA-CE belongs to DNA Oyj, the Finnish telecom operator, but the CE is the important part: this is a customer-edge AS, not DNA's mobile or broadband network. It exists so that single-homed enterprise customers of DNA can be announced without each taking their own AS number.
What it's used for
- Announcing address space that belongs to DNA's customers, not to DNA. The prefixes it originates are Provider-Independent assignments registered to unrelated Finnish companies, including a log-house manufacturer and a test-equipment maker.
- The blocks carry no reverse DNS at all, which is normal for small enterprise PI ranges announced through a carrier's shared AS.
Notable
- Do not classify this as mobile or residential. DNA is one of Finland's three big mobile and broadband operators, which makes the eyeball reading feel obvious. It is wrong here: DNA's consumer subscribers live on other ASNs, and this one carries third-party corporate space.
- This is the RFC 2270 shared-customer shape. Geolocating or kind-labelling the AS as a unit is meaningless because each prefix belongs to a different end customer, so it is deliberately left unclassified.
- Tiny inventory, a few small prefixes, and only a handful of BGP neighbours, none of which resembles a national operator's core.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 4 downstream and 7 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS16086 | DNA Oyj | 177 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 3 prefixes · 1.54K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| FI | Finland | 3 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8236- Registry name
- DNA-CE
- Registrant
- FI2G-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@dnaip.fi
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2017-11-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS8236
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS8236
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,781 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere