asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS16086 DNA

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 1.89M 77 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 7 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly FI
Exchanges 4 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 15 50 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

DNA Oyj

Finland · AI-generated

isp telecom mobile

The reverse zone splits into four suffixes, one of which announces that the addresses behind it are shared.

What it's used for

  • A national provider. Seventy-seven IPv4 prefixes and seven IPv6 prefixes announced from Finland, more than one million eight hundred thousand addresses, across eighty-two observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Fifteen of eighteen queried addresses answered. Every name is the four numbers of the address joined by hyphens, then one of four suffixes, then the same internet-brand domain.
  • One suffix is two letters for broadband, one is two letters for a corporate service, one is the word for reverse, and one prefixes the broadband suffix with the three letters for address translation, so the zone itself says which ranges sit behind shared addresses.
  • Ten netnames share a country code, the brand and a date. Nine dates carry four digits for the year and one carries only two, a survivor of the older format.
  • Two of the twelve blocks looked up are registered to other companies entirely, each with its own abuse contact, inside a network otherwise held end to end by one registry role.

Interesting

  • Address translation is normally invisible from outside. Naming the ranges that use it is a small courtesy to anyone tracing a connection, since it explains why one address maps to many customers.
  • A provider that grew by acquisition often keeps the acquired customers' blocks under their old owners' names. Two enterprise blocks announced here still say who bought them.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 4 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
Sweden Open Network Internet eXchange StockholmStockholm, Sweden185.1.215.46
STHIX - StockholmStockholm, Sweden192.121.80.54
Stockholm Internet ExchangeStockholm, Sweden192.121.80.54
Netnod Sundsvall- GävleSundsvall, Sweden194.68.128.152

Transit providers

15 upstream, 50 downstream and 94 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3356Level 3 Parent, LLC1,990
AS174Cogent Communications, LLC1,293
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC693
AS1257Tele2 Sverige AB84
AS24482SG.GS84
AS42708Glesys AB84
AS50304Blix Solutions AS84
AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AG77

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 77 prefixes · 1.89M addresses IPv6 7 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
FIFinland84

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS16086
Registry name
DNA
Registrant
FI2G-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@dnaip.fi
Registered
2002-08-26
Last changed
2018-11-23
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
85% valid · 72 valid, 13 with no ROA
ROAs
72 authorising AS16086
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 85 of 85 announcements
Route objects
94 naming AS16086

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check