Autonomous system
AS8207 AS8207 - PRIVATE JOINT STOCK COMPANY "DATAGROUP"
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Datagroup (Paco Internet Provider legacy space)
isp business legacy
A small Autonomous System held by PRIVATE JOINT STOCK COMPANY "DATAGROUP", a Ukrainian national telecom operator. Its three /24s are legacy Odessa address space: reverse DNS across them lands on paco.net, the Odessa ISP Paco Internet Provider, which was folded into Datagroup.
What it's used for
- Business and institutional connectivity in and around Odessa, delivered out of a legacy Paco address block that Datagroup now holds.
- Hosts named
nmt.paco.netandtech-gw.frozen.paco.netsit alongside customer gateways on unrelated domains, the classic pattern of an ISP numbering customer edge routers from its own block.
Notable
- Tiny inventory: 3 prefixes, 768 addresses, a single observed BGP neighbour. This is not Datagroup's main network. The operator runs much larger ASNs for its national backbone and Volia consumer business.
- The address space carries business and institutional endpoints, not consumer dial-up or broadband pools, so it should not be read as eyeball space.
Interesting
- One host in the block resolves under a maritime-university domain, a reminder that ISP-held /24s frequently carry third-party customer names rather than the operator's own.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS3326 | PRIVATE JOINT STOCK COMPANY "DATAGROUP" | 177 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 768 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| UA | Ukraine | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8207- Registry name
- AS8207
- Registrant
- DATACOM-NOC
- Abuse contact
- ripe-abuse@datagroup.ua
- Registered
- 2002-09-18
- Last changed
- 2018-09-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 3 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 3 authorising AS8207
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 6 naming AS8207
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere