Autonomous system
AS7687 D-CRUISENET TOYOTA SYSTEMS CORPORATION
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
Toyota Systems Corporation
enterprise legacy
D-CRUISENET is Toyota Systems Corporation, the IT company of the Toyota group, formed in 2019 from the merger of Toyota's internal systems arms. The AS routes the group's shared corporate network.
What it's used for
- An unusually fragmented inventory: around 201,000 addresses across more than 200 prefixes, mostly
/22s and/23s. No IPv6 is announced. - Reverse DNS resolves into Toyota-group company domains rather than into Toyota Systems itself —
ttc-NNN-N.toyotsu.co.jpfor Toyota Tsusho, hosts such asgatekeeper.aisan-ind.co.jpandproxy.aisan-ind.co.jpfor Aisan Industry, a Toyota-affiliated parts maker. Much of the rest publishes only classless-delegation PTRs, which is what corporate space with per-company sub-delegation looks like.
Notable
- This is an enterprise network. The many small prefixes are not the scattered-
/24pattern of an address broker: they are contiguous with each other, all registered in Japan, and their reverse DNS lands consistently on real Toyota-group manufacturers and trading companies. - Attribute addresses here to the specific member company in the rDNS where possible, not to Toyota Systems. The holder is the group's shared IT operator, not the end user of the space.
Interesting
- The size is the surprise. Two hundred thousand addresses is larger than most national ISPs in this range of AS numbers, and it is all one industrial group's private internal estate — a measure of how many suppliers, plants and affiliates sit inside a Japanese keiretsu.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 2 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| JPIX Tokyo | Tokyo, Japan | 210.171.224.131 |
| JPIX Osaka | Osaka, Japan | 103.246.232.131 |
Transit providers
9 upstream, 0 downstream and 9 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 19 prefixes · 201K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| JP | Japan | 19 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS7687- Registry name
- D-CRUISENET
- Registered
- 1997-11-13
- Last changed
- 2024-04-26
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 1% valid · 3 valid, 208 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 7 authorising AS7687
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 211 of 211 announcements
- Route objects
- 533 naming AS7687
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere