asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS7642 DHIRAAGU-MV-AP DHIVEHI RAAJJEYGE GULHUN PLC

Residential APNIC

IPv4 addresses 60.42K 17 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 43 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly MV
Exchanges 4 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 35 10 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Dhiraagu (Dhivehi Raajjeyge Gulhun PLC)

Maldives · AI-generated

isp legacy

DHIRAAGU-MV-AP is Dhivehi Raajjeyge Gulhun PLC, trading as Dhiraagu, the incumbent and largest telecommunications operator in the Maldives. AS7642 is the company's main autonomous system and, in practice, one of the two networks that carry the country's internet.

What it's used for

  • National service across every product line Dhiraagu sells: fixed broadband, mobile, leased data and hosting. It is the only full-service telecoms operator in the Maldives, so a single AS ends up carrying all of it.
  • Around 60,000 IPv4 addresses across roughly 130 mostly-/23 prefixes, plus IPv6 under 2406:e400::/32. Every prefix is registered DHIRAAGU-MV to the company itself.
  • Reverse DNS follows a residential-broadband pattern under the company's dhivehinet.net.mv domain, with names of the form bb-IP-ADDR.dhivehinet.net.mv on subscriber ranges.

Notable

  • Eyeball space. An address here is most likely a Maldivian household or a phone, not a server. Because Dhiraagu runs fixed and mobile on the same AS, mobile traffic and home-broadband traffic are not separable by ASN.
  • Geolocation to the Maldives is safe, but geolocation within the Maldives is not: the country is a thousand-odd islands and the operator moves address pools between atolls.

Interesting

  • Some of Dhiraagu's inventory sits in 69.94.32.0/20 and 209.212.192.0/19, ranges that fall in /8s otherwise associated with the Americas. They are genuine legacy allocations held by an APNIC member. Anything that guesses a country from the /8 will put the Maldives in North America.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 4 exchanges in 4 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
DE-CIX FrankfurtFrankfurt, Germany80.81.194.158
LINX LON1London, United Kingdom195.66.226.75
Equinix Internet Exchange SingaporeSingapore, Singapore27.111.228.167
DE-CIX MumbaiMumbai, India103.27.171.153

Transit providers

35 upstream, 10 downstream and 63 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC5,222
AS1299Arelion Sweden AB626
AS45489Sri Lanka Telecom PLC, GLobal Peering621
AS34549meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG534
AS18001Dialog Axiata PLC.271
AS24482SG.GS143
AS48185team.blue NV141
AS48362Stadtwerke Feldkirch141

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 17 prefixes · 60.42K addresses IPv6 43 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
MVMaldives60

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS7642
Registry name
DHIRAAGU-AS-AP
Registrant
Dhivehi Raajjeyge Gulhun Public Limited Company
Abuse contact
abuse@dhivehinet.net.mv
Registered
2008-09-04
Last changed
2026-10-02
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
99.3% valid · 143 valid, 0 with no ROA 1 RPKI-invalid
ROAs
101 authorising AS7642
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
99.3% registered · 143 of 144 announcements 1 other origin
Route objects
757 naming AS7642

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check