Autonomous system
AS7641 CHINABTN China Broadcasting TV Net
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
China Cable Television Network Co., Ltd.
enterprise legacy
CHINABTN is China Cable Television Network Co., Ltd., the Beijing state enterprise that builds and runs China's national cable-television network and the platform that interconnects the provincial cable operators. It also holds a licence for domestic data transmission.
What it's used for
- The company's own national network. AS7641 announces about 19,000 IPv4 addresses across roughly 28 prefixes, together with IPv6 out of
2403:600::/32. - The address space comes from two sources:
211.89.0.0/16, registered directly toCHINABTN, and blocks inside211.146.0.0/16and211.156.128.0/19, which are CNNIC allocations.
Notable
- Reverse DNS is absent across this inventory. With no PTR records to read, there is no independent evidence of what the addresses carry, and the holder is an operator that could plausibly run backbone, platform hosting or subscriber access. Any confident single-kind label on AS7641 is unsupported.
- Do not read it as a cable-broadband eyeball network on the strength of the name. China's cable subscribers are numbered by provincial network companies on their own ASNs; this AS is the national parent's, and 19,000 addresses is far too small to be a consumer access network in China.
Interesting
- The registry gives the holder's address as the Central Broadcasting and Television Tower in Haidian, Beijing, which is the operational home of the national broadcast network rather than a datacentre. The name is also used by a second, much newer ASN, so
CHINABTNalone does not identify a single network.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 18 prefixes · 18.94K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 19 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS7641- Registry name
- CHINABTN
- Abuse contact
- liw@chinabtn.com
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2023-11-28
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 33 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 9 authorising AS7641
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 33 of 33 announcements
- Route objects
- 65 naming AS7641
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere