Autonomous system
AS7557 KTNET-AS Korea Trade Network
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
KTNET (Korea Trade Network)
enterprise legacy
KTNET-AS-KR is Korea Trade Network, the operator of South Korea's national paperless-trade platform. It was set up in 1990 with funding from the Korea International Trade Association, and it is registered at the Trade Tower in Gangnam, Seoul.
What it's used for
- Running the electronic-trade infrastructure that Korean importers and exporters file through: customs declarations, electronic bills of lading, certificates of origin and the rest of the paperwork of international trade, all handled electronically rather than on paper.
- The platform links trading companies to banks, customs brokers, shippers, insurers and forwarders, so the network carries business-to-business and business-to-government document traffic.
Notable
- An enterprise/platform network rather than an ISP. Nothing here is subscriber access. The address space fronts a document-exchange and transaction system that other companies connect into.
- KTNET holds a surprisingly large amount of address space for a single platform operator, spread across several legacy Korean
/19s. Reverse DNS is essentially absent across all of it, which is common for KRNIC-registered networks and makes the registry the only useful witness. - KTNET is government-designated rather than government-owned, so it is described here as a company operating national infrastructure, not as a state agency.
Interesting
- Korea was an early mover on trade digitisation, and KTNET's platform is one of the longest-running national "single window" systems anywhere.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 69 prefixes · 94.21K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 69 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS7557- Registry name
- KTNET-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1997-05-13
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 66 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS7557
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 66 of 66 announcements
- Route objects
- 55 naming AS7557
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere