asn.dev

Routing security

AS6797 PHONERA Port80 Global Network AS16150

Unclassified APNIC NSP

RPKI valid 100% 13 of 13 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 15 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

13 observed

Every prefix observed with AS6797 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a00:4961::/32RPKI validIRR29
2a02:18f::/32RPKI validIRR31
2a02:460::/32RPKI validIRR31
46.32.156.0/22RPKI validIRR33
62.12.32.0/20RPKI validIRR33
62.12.48.0/21RPKI validIRR33
87.104.192.0/19RPKI validIRR33
87.104.224.0/21RPKI validIRR51
87.104.233.0/24RPKI validIRR45
87.104.234.0/23RPKI validIRR45
87.104.236.0/22RPKI validIRR45
91.198.227.0/24RPKI validIRR52
195.93.182.0/23RPKI validIRR33

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

15 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS6797 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
46.32.156.0/22/22RIPENCC
62.12.32.0/20/20RIPENCC
62.12.48.0/21/21RIPENCC
87.104.192.0/19/19RIPENCC
87.104.224.0/21/21RIPENCC
87.104.233.0/24/24RIPENCC
87.104.234.0/23/23RIPENCC
87.104.236.0/22/22RIPENCC
91.198.227.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.175.132.0/22/22RIPENCC
195.93.182.0/23/23RIPENCC
2a00:4961::/32/32RIPENCC
2a02:189::/32/32RIPENCC
2a02:18f::/32/32RIPENCC
2a02:460::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

15 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS6797 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.175.132.0/22RIPEGlobalConnectIP-ONLY-MNT2024-10-17Not announced
2a02:189::/32RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-02-25Not announced
46.32.156.0/22RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-02-23Announced
62.12.32.0/20RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-02-23Announced
62.12.48.0/21RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-02-23Announced
87.104.192.0/19RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-03-17Announced
87.104.224.0/21RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-03-17Announced
87.104.233.0/24RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-03-17Announced
87.104.234.0/23RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-03-17Announced
87.104.236.0/22RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-03-17Announced
91.198.227.0/24RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-01-23Announced
195.93.182.0/23RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-02-19Announced
2a00:4961::/32RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-02-25Announced
2a02:18f::/32RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-02-25Announced
2a02:460::/32RIPE—AS31027-MNT2026-01-27Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS6797 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-GCNETPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-GCNETRIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS-MANDA-AMSIX-PEERS-V4RIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS-MANDA-AMSIX-PEERS-V6RIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS-MANDA-DECIX-PEERS-V4RIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS-MANDA-DECIX-PEERS-V6RIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS-MANDA-LINX-PEERS-V4RIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS-MANDA-LINX-PEERS-V6RIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS12552:AS-GCNETRIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS216275:AS-TRANSITSRIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS43252:AS-DECIX-HAM-CONNECTEDRIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS43252:AS-DECIX-HAM-RSRIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS43252:AS-DECIX-HAM-RS-V6RIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS6695:AS-DECIX-FRA-CONNECTEDRIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS6695:AS-DECIX-FRA-RSRIPELists AS6797 as a direct member
AS6695:AS-DECIX-FRA-RS-V6RIPELists AS6797 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-11 12:23 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-11. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.