asn.dev

Routing security

AS64063 BDCONNECTNET-AS-AP BDconnect.net

Residential APNIC

RPKI valid 100% 16 of 16 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 18 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

16 observed

Every prefix observed with AS64063 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
103.164.254.0/24RPKI validIRR52
103.200.92.0/24RPKI validIRR57
103.200.93.0/24RPKI validIRR52
103.200.94.0/24RPKI validIRR57
103.200.95.0/24RPKI validIRR52
2407:3380::/36RPKI validIRR34
2407:3380:1000::/36RPKI validIRR34
2407:3380:2000::/36RPKI validIRR34
2407:3380:3000::/36RPKI validIRR34
2407:3380:4000::/36RPKI validIRR34
2407:3380:5000::/36RPKI validIRR34
2407:3380:6000::/36RPKI validIRR33
2407:3380:7000::/36RPKI validIRR33
2407:3380:8000::/36RPKI validIRR33
2407:3380:9000::/36RPKI validIRR33
2407:3380:a000::/36RPKI validIRR33

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

18 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS64063 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

3 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS10075Fiber@Home Global LimitedDeclaredObserved
AS58682Level3 Carrier Ltd.DeclaredObserved
AS58715EARTH TELECOMMUNICATION (Pvt) LTD.Declarednot observed

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

24 objects · 8 not announced

Route objects naming AS64063 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
103.200.92.0/22APNICBDconnectMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2024-12-01Not announced
103.200.92.0/23APNICBDconnectMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2024-12-01Not announced
103.200.94.0/23APNICBDconnectMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2024-12-01Not announced
2407:3380:b000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Not announced
2407:3380:c000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Not announced
2407:3380:d000::/36APNICMd Amjad HossanMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-07Not announced
2407:3380:e000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Not announced
2407:3380:f000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Not announced
103.164.254.0/24APNICBDconnectMAINT-BDCONNECT-BD2024-12-01Announced
103.200.92.0/24APNICBDconnectMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2024-12-01Announced
103.200.93.0/24APNICBDconnectMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2024-12-01Announced
103.200.94.0/24APNICBDconnectMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2024-12-01Announced
103.200.95.0/24APNICBDconnectMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2024-12-01Announced
2407:3380::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Announced
2407:3380:1000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Announced
2407:3380:2000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Announced
2407:3380:3000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Announced
2407:3380:4000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Announced
2407:3380:5000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Announced
2407:3380:6000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Announced
2407:3380:7000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Announced
2407:3380:8000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Announced
2407:3380:9000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Announced
2407:3380:a000::/36APNICBDconnect.Net LimitedMAINT-BDCONNECTNET-BD2021-03-09Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS64063 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-131464APNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-58682APNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-58715APNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-9441APNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-DTLIIG-139901APNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-FGLAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-KDDCUSTOMER2RADBLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-SET-BSCCLAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS64063 as a direct member
AS-WCL-BDAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS132884:AS-CUSTOMERSAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS137967:AS-CUSTOMERSAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS149765:AS-CORONETIIG-BDAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS150748:AS-GMAXAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS17494:AS-CUSTOMERSAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS17806:AS-MANGOTELESERVICE-BDAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS58717:AS-ISP-BDAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS58717:AS-SUMMITCOMMUNICATIONS-BDAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS58778:AS-MANGOITC-BDAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member
AS64063:AS-BDCLAPNICLists AS64063 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.