asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS10075 FGL-AS-BD Fiber@Home Global Limited

Residential APNIC

IPv4 addresses 5.38K 11 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 19 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly BD
Exchanges 5 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 29 189 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Fiber@Home Global Limited

Bangladesh · AI-generated

FGL-AS-BD is the international-gateway and wholesale-transit arm of Fiber@Home, Bangladesh's largest National Telecommunication Transmission Network (NTTN) operator. Despite a small address footprint it is one of the busiest interconnection points in the country.

What it's used for

Fiber@Home (Dhaka, licensed by the BTRC in 2009) builds and leases the fibre backbone that other Bangladeshi operators ride on: underground HDPE duct, SDH/DWDM and IP/MPLS transport reaching down to upazila level. This AS is the IP-layer face of that business, selling upstream transit and gateway capacity to downstream ISPs rather than serving end users directly.

Notable

This is a carrier, and the neighbour count is what settles it. RIS sees only 26 IPv4 prefixes / 5,120 addresses and 8 IPv6 prefixes here, but 311 observed BGP neighbours. An eyeball or hosting network holding ~5k addresses would peer with a handful of ASes; peering with three hundred is only rational if other people's traffic is the product. The v4 space is fragmented into many /22s and /24s drawn from 103.x, 163.47.x and 118.x APNIC blocks, which is the normal shape for an operator that has accreted allocations over fifteen years of growth rather than one large founding grant.

Interesting

The IPv6 story is unusually tidy for the region: a single 2403:cd40::/32 allocation, deaggregated into a few /48s. That the /32 itself is announced alongside its children suggests deliberate covering-route hygiene rather than accidental leakage.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 5 exchanges in 4 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
DE-CIX FrankfurtFrankfurt, Germany80.81.194.46
Equinix Internet Exchange SingaporeSingapore, Singapore27.111.228.140
DE-CIX MumbaiMumbai, India103.27.171.74
BroadBand Internet eXchange SingaporeSingapore, Singapore103.231.153.33
DE-CIX MarseilleMarseille, France185.1.47.145

Transit providers

29 upstream, 189 downstream and 306 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC940
AS3491PCCW Global (HK) Ltd.158
AS64049Reliance Jio Infocomm Pte Ltd Singapore127
AS9498BHARTI Airtel Ltd.109
AS58453China Mobile International Limited102
AS174Cogent Communications, LLC97
AS14593Space Exploration Technologies Corporation80
AS34549meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG71

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 11 prefixes · 5.38K addresses IPv6 19 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
BDBangladesh30

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS10075
Registry name
FGL-AS-BD
Registrant
Fiber@Home Global Limited
Abuse contact
iig@fiberathome.net
Registered
2018-10-22
Last changed
2020-10-06
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 34 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
38 authorising AS10075
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
97% registered · 33 of 34 announcements 1 other origin
Route objects
40 naming AS10075

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check