Autonomous system
AS62077 DTI-DC-PEERING
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
DT Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S.
isp residential turkey cable
The AS handle DTI-DC-PEERING is held by DT Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S.
What it's used for
- The address space carries mixed registrants including
DT Teknoloji Anonim Sirketi,Borusan Telekom Backbone Group,WARPIRIS BILISIM TEKNOLOJILERI ANONIM SIRKETI, andGeo Teknoloji A.S. - The AS announces 1280 IPv4 addresses across 4 prefixes and maintains 8 observed neighbours, a ratio consistent with a regional access or peering network.
- As a licensed telecommunications operator in the cable and subscription programming sector, the traffic consists of subscriber eyeballs and service endpoints for its Istanbul-based operations.
Notable
- Registrants vary across the announced prefixes, with
DT Teknoloji Anonim Sirketiholding the largest block andBorusan Telekom Backbone Groupholding a separate /24. - The address inventory is small and fragmented, consisting of one /23 and three /24 blocks, all located in Turkey.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
6 upstream, 2 downstream and 8 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 1.28K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| TR | Turkey | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS62077- Registry name
- DTI-DC-PEERING
- Registrant
- DT Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S.
- Abuse contact
- tolga.dincer@dt.net.tr
- Registered
- 2014-02-21
- Last changed
- 2023-06-14
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 5 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 8 authorising AS62077
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 5 of 5 announcements
- Route objects
- 7 naming AS62077
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-24. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere