asn.dev

Routing security

AS60764 TK-TELECOM

Unclassified RIPE NSP

RPKI valid 100% 11 of 11 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

11 observed

Every prefix observed with AS60764 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0b:b500::/31RPKI validIRR35
2a0b:b500::/32RPKI validIRR35
2a09:3300::/32RPKI validIRR35
86.62.12.0/24RPKI validIRR56
86.62.13.0/24RPKI validIRR56
86.62.14.0/24RPKI validIRR56
86.62.15.0/24RPKI validIRR56
185.174.192.0/24RPKI validIRR55
185.174.193.0/24RPKI validIRR56
185.174.194.0/24RPKI validIRR56
185.174.195.0/24RPKI validIRR56

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS60764 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
86.62.12.0/24/32RIPENCC
86.62.13.0/24/32RIPENCC
86.62.14.0/24/32RIPENCC
86.62.15.0/24/32RIPENCC
185.174.192.0/24/32RIPENCC
185.174.193.0/24/32RIPENCC
185.174.194.0/24/32RIPENCC
185.174.195.0/24/32RIPENCC
2a09:3300::/32/32RIPENCC
2a0b:b500::/30/30RIPENCC
2a0b:b500::/31/31RIPENCC
2a0b:b500::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

11 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS60764 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
86.62.12.0/24RIPETelecom Samara LLCMNT-RU-TELECOMSAMARA-12018-12-28Announced
86.62.13.0/24RIPETelecom Samara LLCMNT-RU-TELECOMSAMARA-12019-06-26Announced
86.62.14.0/24RIPETelecom Samara LLCMNT-RU-TELECOMSAMARA-12019-06-26Announced
86.62.15.0/24RIPETelecom Samara LLCMNT-RU-TELECOMSAMARA-12019-06-26Announced
185.174.192.0/24RIPETelecom Samara LLCMNT-RU-TELECOMSAMARA-12018-12-15Announced
185.174.193.0/24RIPETelecom Samara LLCMNT-RU-TELECOMSAMARA-12018-12-15Announced
185.174.194.0/24RIPETelecom Samara LLCMNT-RU-TELECOMSAMARA-12018-12-15Announced
185.174.195.0/24RIPETelecom Samara LLCMNT-RU-TELECOMSAMARA-12018-12-15Announced
2a09:3300::/32RIPE—MNT-RU-TELECOMSAMARA-12024-01-23Announced
2a0b:b500::/31RIPETelecom Samara Customers IPv6 NetworkMNT-RU-TELECOMSAMARA-12018-12-15Announced
2a0b:b500::/32RIPE—MNT-RU-TELECOMSAMARA-12024-01-24Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS60764 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-TKTELPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-EMIXRADBLists AS60764 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS60764 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS60764 as a direct member
AS-MF-MGSMRIPELists AS60764 as a direct member
AS-OSNOVA-UPSTREAMRIPELists AS60764 as a direct member
AS-RASCOM-AMSIXRIPELists AS60764 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS60764 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS60764 as a direct member
AS-ROSTELECOMRIPELists AS60764 as a direct member
AS-TERMPLUSRIPELists AS60764 as a direct member
AS-TKTELRIPELists AS60764 as a direct member
AS-TKTEL-IXRIPELists AS60764 as a direct member
AS41194:AS-RASCOMRIPELists AS60764 as a direct member
AS61180:AS-PEERS-AMSIXRIPELists AS60764 as a direct member
AS8218:AS-AMSIX-RSRIPELists AS60764 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.