Autonomous system
AS58461 CT-HANGZHOU-IDC No.288,Fu-chun Road
Hosting APNIC
Summary
China Telecom Hangzhou IDC
hosting datacenter transit china
CT-HANGZHOU-IDC is China Telecom's internet data centre network for Hangzhou,
registered to the carrier at No. 288 Fuchun Road, Hangzhou 310066. It is the
hosting and colocation arm of CHINANET in Zhejiang province, not an independent
company.
What it's used for
Data centre hosting, colocation and regional transit in Zhejiang. RIS observes
363 IPv4 prefixes carrying roughly 358,656 addresses, and no IPv6. The inventory
is heavily deaggregated: 227 of those prefixes are /24s, tailing off through
/23s and /22s to a single /16, spread across the 36.2x, 60.188-60.191,
61.130, 61.153, 61.164, 61.174, 115.22x and 115.23x ranges CHINANET
Zhejiang has held for years. Transit is a single upstream, CHINANET Backbone
([AS4134](https://asn.ipinfo.app/AS4134)), which is the parent network.
Notable
- Despite the "IDC" name, this AS sells transit onward rather than only hosting. Zhejiang Ruili Information Technology ([AS59037](https://asn.ipinfo.app/AS59037)) reaches the internet through AS58461 as its only observed upstream, and NetEase ([AS45062](https://asn.ipinfo.app/AS45062)), Zhejiang Geely Holding Group ([AS139099](https://asn.ipinfo.app/AS139099)) and Alibaba ([AS37963](https://asn.ipinfo.app/AS37963)) each carry it as one of theirs. The customer list reads as a who's-who of Hangzhou-headquartered companies, which is exactly what a provincial China Telecom IDC should look like.
- Individual blocks are assigned onward to tenants, and the registry records the tenant, not China Telecom.
115.231.78.0/25, for example, is netnameDUCHUANG-KEJI, described as "Hangzhou Duchuang Keji Co.,Ltd" and markedASSIGNED NON-PORTABLE. A whois lookup on one of those addresses surfaces the tenant company and can read like an independent hosting provider; the AS holder is still China Telecom. Contacts on the assignments resolve to CHINANET-ZJ in Jiaxing with abuse handled byIRT-CHINANET-ZJ, while the AS object itself carries the nationalIRT-CHINANET-CNrole. - There is no PeeringDB record, and reverse DNS is absent across the sampled address space, so name-based identification of a host here comes up empty. Registry data is the only reliable handle.
Interesting
- The AS was registered in December 2011 and last changed in May 2020, so this is settled, long-lived carrier space rather than recently traded blocks. It still announces no IPv6 whatsoever, a notable gap for a 358,000-address data centre network.
- "No.288,Fu-chun Road" showing up as the AS description is the registered postal address of the facility. It is a common APNIC convention for the organisation field to carry a street address where a trading name would normally go, which is why this network is often listed under what looks like a fragment of an address.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Address space
Summary
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 232 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS58461- Registry name
- CT-HangZhou-IDC
- Abuse contact
- anti-spam@chinatelecom.cn
- Registered
- 2011-12-01
- Last changed
- 2020-05-14
- Status
- active
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere