asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS58461 CT-HANGZHOU-IDC No.288,Fu-chun Road

Hosting APNIC

IPv4 addresses 359K 230 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CN
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 6 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

China Telecom Hangzhou IDC

China · AI-generated

hosting datacenter transit china

CT-HANGZHOU-IDC is China Telecom's internet data centre network for Hangzhou, registered to the carrier at No. 288 Fuchun Road, Hangzhou 310066. It is the hosting and colocation arm of CHINANET in Zhejiang province, not an independent company.

What it's used for

Data centre hosting, colocation and regional transit in Zhejiang. RIS observes 363 IPv4 prefixes carrying roughly 358,656 addresses, and no IPv6. The inventory is heavily deaggregated: 227 of those prefixes are /24s, tailing off through /23s and /22s to a single /16, spread across the 36.2x, 60.188-60.191, 61.130, 61.153, 61.164, 61.174, 115.22x and 115.23x ranges CHINANET Zhejiang has held for years. Transit is a single upstream, CHINANET Backbone (AS4134), which is the parent network.

Notable

  • Despite the "IDC" name, this AS sells transit onward rather than only hosting. Zhejiang Ruili Information Technology (AS59037) reaches the internet through AS58461 as its only observed upstream, and NetEase (AS45062), Zhejiang Geely Holding Group (AS139099) and Alibaba (AS37963) each carry it as one of theirs. The customer list reads as a who's-who of Hangzhou-headquartered companies, which is exactly what a provincial China Telecom IDC should look like.
  • Individual blocks are assigned onward to tenants, and the registry records the tenant, not China Telecom. 115.231.78.0/25, for example, is netname DUCHUANG-KEJI, described as "Hangzhou Duchuang Keji Co.,Ltd" and marked ASSIGNED NON-PORTABLE. A whois lookup on one of those addresses surfaces the tenant company and can read like an independent hosting provider; the AS holder is still China Telecom. Contacts on the assignments resolve to CHINANET-ZJ in Jiaxing with abuse handled by IRT-CHINANET-ZJ, while the AS object itself carries the national IRT-CHINANET-CN role.
  • There is no PeeringDB record, and reverse DNS is absent across the sampled address space, so name-based identification of a host here comes up empty. Registry data is the only reliable handle.

Interesting

  • The AS was registered in December 2011 and last changed in May 2020, so this is settled, long-lived carrier space rather than recently traded blocks. It still announces no IPv6 whatsoever, a notable gap for a 358,000-address data centre network.
  • "No.288,Fu-chun Road" showing up as the AS description is the registered postal address of the facility. It is a common APNIC convention for the organisation field to carry a street address where a trading name would normally go, which is why this network is often listed under what looks like a fragment of an address.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 6 downstream and 11 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4134No.31,Jin-rong Street20,837

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 230 prefixes · 359K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
CNChina230

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS58461
Registry name
CT-HangZhou-IDC
Abuse contact
anti-spam@chinatelecom.cn
Registered
2011-12-01
Last changed
2020-05-14
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
99.2% valid · 363 valid, 0 with no ROA 3 RPKI-invalid
ROAs
412 authorising AS58461
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
99.2% registered · 363 of 366 announcements
Route objects
408 naming AS58461

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check