asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS56716 XATNET

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 2.30K 3 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly UA
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

XATNET

Ukraine · AI-generated

isp residential ukraine small

The AS handle XATNET is held by IE Didyk Dmitriy Sergeyevich.

What it's used for

  • The address space carries residential or small-business internet access, evidenced by the reverse DNS domain xat.net.ua and netnames SYNDICATE-NET2 and XATNET.
  • The AS announces 2304 IPv4 addresses across 3 prefixes and maintains 3 observed neighbours, a ratio consistent with a small access provider rather than a transit carrier.
  • Traffic from this AS consists of subscriber eyeballs connecting to the internet via the operator's local infrastructure in Ukraine.

Notable

  • Registrants for the two largest prefixes (31.129.236.0/22 and 31.129.240.0/22) are listed as FOP Samoilenko Igor Olegovich, while the smallest prefix (91.226.201.0/24) is registered to IE Didyk Dmitriy Sergeyevich, the AS holder.
  • The address inventory is composed of two /22 blocks and one /24 block, all located in Ukraine.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS199995Omega Telecom LLC163
AS3326PRIVATE JOINT STOCK COMPANY "DATAGROUP"35

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-19, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 3 prefixes · 2.30K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
UAUkraine3

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS56716
Registry name
XATNET
Registrant
MNT-XATNET
Abuse contact
incokeeper@ukr.net
Registered
2011-05-02
Last changed
2024-01-25
Allocation
allocated

Declared

PeeringDB profile

self-reported
Name
XATNET
Scope
Not Disclosed
Traffic ratio
Not Disclosed

PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
67% valid · 2 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
2 authorising AS56716
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
Route objects
4 naming AS56716

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check