asn.dev

Routing security

AS56566 SATT-AS

Unclassified AFRINIC

RPKI valid 100% 10 of 10 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 10 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

10 observed

Every prefix observed with AS56566 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a00:de00::/32RPKI validIRR34
31.31.224.0/19RPKI validIRR52
89.190.52.0/23RPKI validIRR52
89.190.55.0/24RPKI validIRR51
91.224.64.0/23RPKI validIRR52
91.224.100.0/23RPKI validIRR52
212.4.142.0/23RPKI validIRR52
212.96.185.0/24RPKI validIRR52
213.211.37.0/24RPKI validIRR52
213.211.44.0/22RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

10 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS56566 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
31.31.224.0/19/24RIPENCC
89.190.52.0/23/23RIPENCC
89.190.55.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.224.64.0/23/24RIPENCC
91.224.100.0/23/24RIPENCC
212.4.142.0/23/23RIPENCC
212.96.185.0/24/24RIPENCC
213.211.37.0/24/24RIPENCC
213.211.44.0/22/22RIPENCC
2a00:de00::/32/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS56566 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
31.31.224.0/19RIPESATT a.s.SATT-MNT2011-03-21Announced
89.190.52.0/23RIPE—MNET-IP-MNT2023-11-07Announced
89.190.55.0/24RIPE—MNET-IP-MNT2023-11-07Announced
91.224.64.0/23RIPE—SATT-MNT2023-11-13Announced
91.224.100.0/23RIPE—SATT-MNT2023-11-13Announced
212.4.142.0/23RIPE—MNET-IP-MNT2023-11-07Announced
212.96.185.0/24RIPE—MNET-IP-MNT2023-11-07Announced
213.211.37.0/24RIPE—MNET-IP-MNT2023-11-07Announced
213.211.44.0/22RIPE—MNET-IP-MNT2023-11-07Announced
2a00:de00::/32RIPESATT a.s.SATT-MNT2011-09-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS56566 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CETINRIPELists AS56566 as a direct member
AS-CZECHBONERIPELists AS56566 as a direct member
AS-GRAPESC-CZRIPELists AS56566 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS56566 as a direct member
AS-ISPALLIANCE-CZRIPELists AS56566 as a direct member
AS12570:AS-CUSTOMERSRIPELists AS56566 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-19 12:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-19. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.