Autonomous system
AS56566 SATT-AS
Unclassified AFRINIC
Summary
SATT a.s.
isp residential czech broadband
The AS handle SATT-AS is held by SATT a.s., a regional telecommunications provider operating in the Czech Republic.
What it's used for
- The address space carries residential broadband traffic, evidenced by reverse DNS entries such as
uidzr46254.sattnet.czanduidnm53126.sattnet.czwhich indicate user-defined or dynamic hostnames on thesattnet.czdomain. - The network announces 12,032 IPv4 addresses across 9 prefixes and 1 IPv6 prefix, with only 2 observed routing neighbours, a ratio characteristic of an access or eyeball network rather than a transit provider.
- Traffic from this AS consists of subscriber internet access for residential customers in the Czech region, specifically around Žďár nad Sázavou and surrounding areas.
Notable
- Registrants for the largest prefixes are consistent with the announcer, listing
SATT a.s.andAbuse-C Rolefor netnames includingCZ-SATT-20110321andSATTNET. - The address inventory is composed of multiple smaller blocks, including a /19 and several /23 and /24 prefixes, all located in Czechia.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 9 prefixes · 12.03K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CZ | Czechia | 10 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- AFRINIC
- Handle
AS56566- Registry name
- SATT-AS
- Registrant
- SATT a.s.
- Abuse contact
- abuse@satt.cz
- Registered
- 2011-03-21
- Last changed
- 2018-09-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 10 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 10 authorising AS56566
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 10 of 10 announcements
- Route objects
- 10 naming AS56566
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere