asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS55616 DGIST-AS-KR DGIST

Unclassified ARIN

IPv4 addresses 4.86K 7 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 3 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

DGIST

Korea, Republic of · AI-generated

education research university

DGIST-AS-KR is operated by DGIST (Daegu Gyeongbuk Institute of Science and Technology).

What it's used for

  • The address space carries institutional traffic for a public science and engineering university, with netnames KREN-KR, KREONet-KR, and KORNET-KR indicating allocation via Korean national research and education networks.
  • The AS announces 4,864 IPv4 addresses across 7 prefixes and maintains 3 observed neighbours, a ratio consistent with a single-site institutional network rather than a transit or access provider.
  • Traffic from this AS consists of research, academic, and administrative endpoints associated with the university's campus in Daegu.

Notable

  • Registrants for all announced prefixes are IRT-KRNIC-KR, aligning with the Korean Network Information Center as the upstream allocator for the university's space.
  • The inventory is composed of seven distinct IPv4 prefixes, including a /21 and a /22, with no IPv6 prefixes currently announced.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

3 upstream, 0 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4766Korea Telecom422
AS1237KISTI132
AS9270National Infomation Society Agency39

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 7 prefixes · 4.86K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of7

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS55616
Registry name
DGIST-AS-KR-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
2010-07-21
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 11 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS55616
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 11 of 11 announcements
Route objects
10 naming AS55616

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check