Autonomous system
AS5401 ASN-CLUENET
Unclassified RIPE Non-Profit
Summary
ClueNet (Daniel Roesen)
other legacy
ASN-CLUENET is The ClueNet Project, a small non-commercial network registered to Daniel Roesen in Cologne, Germany.
What it's used for
- A hobbyist / community network run by a network engineer: a handful of prefixes used for personal and project infrastructure and for hands-on BGP work rather than for selling connectivity.
Notable
- Tiny footprint — a few hundred IPv4 addresses — which is unusual next to the carriers that surround it in the low-5000s ASN range.
- Registered to an individual rather than a company, one of the relatively few personal AS numbers in this part of the number space.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Megaport Dusseldorf IX | Düsseldorf, Germany | 194.146.118.132 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 3 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| DE | Germany | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS5401- Registry name
- ASN-CLUENET
- Registrant
- CLUE-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@cluenet.de
- Registered
- 2001-12-24
- Last changed
- 2022-01-06
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- ClueNet
- Network type
- Non-Profit
- Scope
- Regional
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
- Peering policy
- Selective
- IRR as-set
AS-CLUENET- Present at
- 1 exchanges
- Facilities
- 1 facilities
- Website
- http://www.cluenet.de/
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 75% valid · 3 valid, 1 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 3 authorising AS5401
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 4 of 4 announcements
- Route objects
- 4 naming AS5401
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,772 prefixes, as published 2026-10-15. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere