Autonomous system
AS50053 ANTON-LEVIN-AS
Unclassified DROP-listed space RIPE
Summary
Anton Levin
hosting residential kyrgyzstan
The AS handle ANTON-LEVIN-AS is held by Anton Levin.
What it's used for
- The address space carries a mix of Kyrgyzstan-based blocks and international allocations, with netnames including
KG-ANTLEVIN-20141022,VDSKA, andKG-ANTLEVIN-20010302registered to Anton Levin, alongsideUS-ACEDATACENTER-20100921andLT-DOMINANT-20080604. - The AS announces 32,512 IPv4 addresses across 104 prefixes and 7 IPv6 prefixes, with 111 prefixes located in Kyrgyzstan, against only 6 observed neighbours, indicating a role focused on local access or hosting rather than transit.
- Traffic from this AS consists of subscriber and hosting endpoints within Kyrgyzstan, supported by the high address-to-neighbour ratio and the presence of data center and ISP-related netnames.
Notable
- Registrants for the largest prefixes include Anton Levin, Ace Data Centers II, LLC, Dominant Plius UAB, Soltia Consulting SL, Saftal Management Consultancies - Fzco, and Invermae Solutions SL, showing a diverse set of underlying allocations.
- The address inventory is fragmented across multiple countries and registrants, with significant portions held by third parties such as Ace Data Centers and Dominant Plius, suggesting leased or historically acquired space.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
6 upstream, 0 downstream and 10 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 104 prefixes · 32.51K addresses IPv6 7 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KG | Kyrgyzstan | 111 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS50053- Registry name
- VDSKA-AS
- Registrant
- lir-kg-antlevin-1-MNT
- Abuse contact
- support@vdska.online
- Registered
- 2023-03-27
- Last changed
- 2026-04-11
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 96% valid · 128 valid, 5 with no ROA 1 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 134 authorising AS50053
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 99.3% registered · 133 of 134 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 144 naming AS50053
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
5 DROP matches Announced space overlapping the DROP prefix list.
| Announced | DROP entry | Record |
|---|---|---|
| 130.12.45.0/24 | 130.12.44.0/22 | SBL697029 |
| 130.12.46.0/24 | 130.12.44.0/22 | SBL697029 |
| 2a0d:6c2:14::/48 | 2a0d:6c2::/32 | SBL635654 |
| 2a0d:6c2:16::/47 | 2a0d:6c2::/32 | SBL635654 |
| 2a0d:6c2:24::/47 | 2a0d:6c2::/32 | SBL635654 |
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 440 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere