asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS48695 ATHEEB-AS

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 101K 34 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 179 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly SA
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 11 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Etihad GO Telecom

Saudi Arabia · AI-generated

residential mobile isp saudi

ATHEEB-AS is operated by Etihad GO Telecom.

What it's used for

  • The address space carries consumer broadband and mobile traffic, with netnames explicitly identifying Consumer_WImax, Consumer_Wimax_Jed, Consumer_LTE_FTTH, and Consumer_LTE_FTTH_2.
  • The AS announces 100,864 IPv4 addresses and 179 IPv6 prefixes while maintaining only 11 observed neighbours, a ratio characteristic of an access network serving end-users rather than a transit provider.
  • Traffic consists of subscriber eyeballs for voice services and broadband internet across 12 cities in Saudi Arabia.

Notable

  • Registrants for the largest prefixes are listed as Abuse-C Role, which aligns with the operator's abuse contact rather than indicating a separate entity.
  • The address inventory is segmented by technology and geography, with distinct blocks for WiMax and LTE/FTTH services in areas like Jeddah.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 11 downstream and 14 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS47794Etihad GO Company For communications35,462

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-12, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 34 prefixes · 101K addresses IPv6 179 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
SASaudi Arabia213

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS48695
Registry name
ATHEEB-AS
Registrant
atheeb-mnt
Abuse contact
abuse@go.com.sa
Registered
2009-01-06
Last changed
2019-12-16
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 804 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
1,128 authorising AS48695
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 804 of 804 announcements
Route objects
1,070 naming AS48695

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,769 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check