asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS4835 CHINANET-IDC-SN China Telecom Group

Hosting APNIC

IPv4 addresses 206K 77 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 12 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CN
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

China Telecom ChinaNet IDC (Shaanxi)

China · AI-generated

hosting legacy

Autonomous System 4835 (CHINANET-IDC-SN) is a China Telecom network dedicated to IDC (internet data centre) address space, anchored on the provincial ChinaNet network carrying the SN designator and the data centres in Xi'an.

What it's used for

  • Announcing China Telecom's data-centre and hosting address space: servers, colocated customers and the Chinese IDC operators that take space and transit from ChinaNet.
  • Blocks originated here include both ChinaNet's own provincial IDC ranges and address space registered to independent Chinese hosting companies.

Notable

  • A hosting network, not an eyeball one. Addresses seen from this AS are far more likely to be servers than home broadband users, which matters when interpreting traffic from it.
  • It is a provincial IDC AS inside the much larger China Telecom group, and should not be conflated with the group's mass-market backbone (AS4134, ChinaNet "163") or its premium CN2 core (AS4809).

Interesting

  • The registry description of the province is ambiguous in the classic way: APNIC's text and the SN code point at Shaanxi, and the individual IDC blocks are registered in Xi'an, but the same records have long been transcribed as "Shanxi" too. The two provinces are distinct, and the paperwork does not always say which one it means.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS4134No.31,Jin-rong Street4,513

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 77 prefixes · 206K addresses IPv6 12 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
CNChina89

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS4835
Registry name
CHINANET-IDC-SN
Abuse contact
anti-spam@chinatelecom.cn
Registered
2008-09-04
Last changed
2020-05-14
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 86 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
114 authorising AS4835
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
97% registered · 83 of 86 announcements 2 other origin
Route objects
193 naming AS4835

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check