Autonomous system
AS48159 TIC-AS Telecommunication Infrastructure Company
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Telecommunication Infrastructure Company
transit infrastructure government iran
TIC-AS is operated by Telecommunication Infrastructure Company.
What it's used for
- The address space carries infrastructure and enterprise traffic, with netnames
IR-TIC-20100629andIR-TIC-20121127registered to the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, andIR-DCC-20101018registered to Iran Information Technology Company PJSC. - The AS announces 3840 IPv4 addresses across 6 prefixes and 1 IPv6 prefix, while maintaining 12 observed neighbours; this ratio of moderate address space to a significant number of peers indicates a transit or backbone role rather than a pure access network.
- As the government-owned entity responsible for the development, management, and maintenance of Iran's telecommunication network infrastructure, the traffic consists of backbone transit, interconnection, and infrastructure backhaul.
Notable
- Registrants are mixed, with the largest prefixes registered to both Telecommunication Infrastructure Company and Iran Information Technology Company PJSC, suggesting shared or leased address space within the Iranian telecom sector.
- The address inventory is fragmented across multiple /22 and /24 blocks, including space in the 2.189.0.0/16 range, which is consistent with a national infrastructure provider managing diverse network segments.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 11 downstream and 14 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS49666 | Telecommunication Infrastructure Company | 840 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-03, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 6 prefixes · 3.84K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| IR | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | 7 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS48159- Registry name
- TIC-AS
- Registrant
- Telecommunication Infrastructure Company
- Abuse contact
- l_meybodi@tic.ir
- Registered
- 2012-01-05
- Last changed
- 2024-09-28
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- TIC AS48159
- Also known as
- TIC
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
- Peering policy
- Selective
- IRR as-set
RIPE::AS-TICIR- Website
- http://tic.ir
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 15 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 172 authorising AS48159
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 93% registered · 14 of 15 announcements
- Route objects
- 174 naming AS48159
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 451 networks and 1,853 prefixes, as published 2026-11-04. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere