Autonomous system
AS47583 AS-HOSTINGER
Hosting RIPE
Summary
Hostinger International
hosting vps
Hostinger International, a large Lithuania-based web host known for low-cost shared hosting, VPS, and cloud plans aimed at individuals and small businesses worldwide.
What it's used for
- Shared web hosting, VPS, and managed WordPress for a very large, price-sensitive customer base.
Notable
- An IP here identifies Hostinger as the host, not the site owner — mass shared hosting means many unrelated sites (and occasional abuse) share ranges.
- Hostinger also operates the Hostinger and (historically) 000webhost brands.
Interesting
- Founded in 2004 in Kaunas, Hostinger has grown into one of the largest volume web hosts by number of customers.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 8 exchanges in 8 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| IX.br (PTT.br) São Paulo | São Paulo, Brazil | 187.16.211.215 |
| DE-CIX Frankfurt | Frankfurt, Germany | 80.81.197.57 |
| Indonesian Internet Exchange (IIX-Jakarta) | Jakarta, Indonesia | 123.108.12.15 |
| France-IX Paris | Paris, France | 37.49.238.227 |
| Equinix Internet Exchange Singapore | Singapore, Singapore | 27.111.231.79 |
| DE-CIX Mumbai | Mumbai, India | 103.27.170.41 |
| Baltic Internet Exchange | Vilnius, Lithuania | 77.241.206.116 |
| Massachusetts Internet Exchange | Boston, United States | 206.53.143.30 |
Transit providers
50 upstream, 0 downstream and 80 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 540 prefixes · 1.31M addresses IPv6 31 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CY | Cyprus | 571 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS47583- Registry name
- AS-HOSTINGER
- Registrant
- MNT-HOSTINGER
- Abuse contact
- abuse@hostinger.com
- Registered
- 2011-04-04
- Last changed
- 2026-07-21
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 4,399 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 1,279 authorising AS47583
- ASPA
- 24 declared providers
- IRR
- 100.0% registered · 4,398 of 4,399 announcements
- Route objects
- 1,858 naming AS47583
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
6 IC3 indicators addresses in this network appear in FBI IC3 cybersecurity advisories.
| Prefix | Advisory | Published |
|---|---|---|
156.67.220.50 | China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems | 2026-08-26 |
185.201.9.198 | China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems | 2026-08-26 |
193.160.65.116 | China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems | 2026-08-26 |
31.170.160.61 | China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems | 2026-08-26 |
31.170.161.71 | China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems | 2026-08-26 |
31.170.161.78 | China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems | 2026-08-26 |
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere