Autonomous system
AS47237 NURTELECOM-AS-RIPE
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
NUR Telecom
isp residential kyrgyzstan access
NURTELECOM-AS-RIPE is operated by NUR Telecom LLC.
What it's used for
- The address space carries residential and business internet access, evidenced by reverse DNS entries such as
Pool-95.87.66.1.o.kgandfna.o.kg. - The AS announces 3,840 IPv4 addresses across 4 prefixes and 1 IPv6 prefix, while maintaining only 5 observed routing neighbours.
- This high address-to-neighbour ratio indicates an access network providing last-mile connectivity to end-users in Kyrgyzstan.
Notable
- All registrants for the announced prefixes are NUR Telecom LLC or its monitoring department, consistent with the AS holder.
- The inventory consists of four distinct IPv4 blocks and a single IPv6 prefix, all located in Kyrgyzstan.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| KG-IX | Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan | 185.1.110.7 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-22, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 3.84K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KG | Kyrgyzstan | 5 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS47237- Registry name
- NURTELECOM-AS-RIPE
- Registrant
- NURTELECOM-RIPE-MNT
- Abuse contact
- smurzin@nurtelecom.kg
- Registered
- 2008-05-22
- Last changed
- 2024-10-07
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- NUR Telecom Bishkek
- Also known as
- nurtel
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
RIPE::AS-NUR- Present at
- 1 exchanges
- Website
- https://o.kg
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 15 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 5 authorising AS47237
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 15 of 15 announcements
- Route objects
- 15 naming AS47237
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-23. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere