Autonomous system
AS41745 FORTIS-AS Hosting services
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Fortis-AS
hosting residential business
FORTIS-AS is operated by Baykov Ilya Sergeevich.
What it's used for
- The address space carries hosting and residential infrastructure, evidenced by netnames such as
BG-NETERRAIP-20180612(Neterra Ltd.),RU-MAINACC-20190807(ONER INVESTMENTS NOC TEAM), andRU-VPSVILLE1-19880518(LLC Vpsville). - The AS announces 53,504 IPv4 addresses across 144 prefixes and 1 IPv6 prefix, with 11 observed neighbours; this ratio of high address volume to low peering count indicates an access or hosting network rather than a transit provider.
- Traffic from this AS consists of web hosting endpoints, VPS instances, and residential subscriber connections, consistent with the operator's classification as a hosting service provider.
Notable
- Registrants include Neterra Ltd., ONER INVESTMENTS NOC TEAM, DGTL TECH UK LLP, LLC Vpsville, and Abuse-C Role, indicating a diverse portfolio of leased or managed IP blocks rather than a single corporate estate.
- The inventory is fragmented across multiple /22 and /23 blocks from various RIRs, including RIPE and ARIN, reflecting historical acquisitions or leasing of address space.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
11 upstream, 0 downstream and 12 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 161 prefixes · 59.14K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 162 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS41745- Registry name
- FORTIS-AS
- Registrant
- HIP-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@fortis.host
- Registered
- 2021-02-05
- Last changed
- 2024-04-14
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- Baykov Ilya Sergeevich, Hosting services
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 97% valid · 227 valid, 5 with no ROA 1 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 229 authorising AS41745
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 99.6% registered · 232 of 233 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 239 naming AS41745
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,782 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
4 IC3 indicators addresses in this network appear in FBI IC3 cybersecurity advisories.
| Prefix | Advisory | Published |
|---|---|---|
194.104.10.58 | China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems | 2026-08-26 |
31.169.126.162 | China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems | 2026-08-26 |
45.95.2.119 | China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems | 2026-08-26 |
94.156.236.183 | China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems | 2026-08-26 |
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere