Autonomous system
AS38345 ZDNS Internet Domain Name System Beijing Engineering Resrarch Center Ltd.
Unclassified APNIC
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Hong Kong Internet Exchange | Hong Kong, China | 2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a015 |
Transit providers
5 upstream, 2 downstream and 10 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 9 prefixes · 6.14K addresses IPv6 9 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 18 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS38345- Registry name
- ZDNS
- Abuse contact
- xingzhijie@knet.cn
- Registered
- 2011-05-23
- Last changed
- 2023-11-28
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 87% valid · 33 valid, 3 with no ROA 2 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 33 authorising AS38345
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 95% registered · 36 of 38 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 114 naming AS38345
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,772 prefixes, as published 2026-10-15. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere