asn.dev

Routing security

AS270470 LN TELECOM

Residential LACNIC

RPKI valid 100% 10 of 10 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 10 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

10 observed

Every prefix observed with AS270470 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
24.152.8.0/22RPKI validNo IRR55
24.152.8.0/23RPKI validNo IRR11
24.152.8.0/24RPKI validNo IRR51
24.152.9.0/24RPKI validNo IRR51
24.152.10.0/23RPKI validNo IRR11
24.152.10.0/24RPKI validNo IRR51
24.152.11.0/24RPKI validNo IRR51
2804:6c78::/32RPKI validNo IRR34
2804:6c78::/33RPKI validNo IRR19
2804:6c78:8000::/33RPKI validNo IRR19

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS270470 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
24.152.8.0/22/24LACNIC
2804:6c78::/32/33LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

4 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLCDeclaredObserved
AS53062GGNET TELECOMUNICACOES LTDADeclaredObserved
AS263495INFOSERVIC INFORMATICA TELECOMUNICACAO LTDADeclaredObserved
AS265189Inova FibraDeclarednot observed
AS24482SG.GSnot declaredObserved
AS35280F5 Networks SARLnot declaredObserved
AS37721Virtual Technologies & Solutionsnot declaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS270470 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS270470 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-267613RADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-28124RADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSALTDBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS177RADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS237RADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-6RADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-E1-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-EAI:AS-263495RADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-FLYSRADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-OPENX-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS270470 as a direct member
AS-ROCKETNETWORK-TOOLS-2RADBLists AS270470 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.