asn.dev

Routing security

AS267748 TNS CHILE-TECHNETSECURITY S.A

Unclassified RIPE Enterprise

RPKI valid 100% 3 of 3 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 3 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

3 observed

Every prefix observed with AS267748 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
167.250.196.0/23RPKI validIRR51
167.250.196.0/24RPKI validIRR9
167.250.197.0/24RPKI validIRR9

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

3 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS267748 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
167.250.196.0/23/24LACNIC
167.250.196.0/24/24LACNIC
167.250.197.0/24/24LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

7 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS174Cogent Communications, LLCDeclaredObserved
AS6057Administracion Nacional de TelecomunicacionesDeclarednot observed
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLCDeclaredObserved
AS52468UFINET PANAMA S.A.Declarednot observed
AS61522unnamedDeclarednot observed
AS199524G-Core Labs S.A.Declarednot observed
AS265703AUSTRO INTERNET S.A.DeclaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

4 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS267748 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
167.250.196.0/23LACNICLACNIC generated route for TNS CHILE-TECHNETSECURITY S.AMNT-CL-TCSA68-LACNIC2026-10-29Announced
167.250.196.0/23NTTCOMTELMEX-CL-SSEE cliente TNSMAINT-AMCL-BB2020-12-22Announced
167.250.196.0/24LACNICLACNIC generated route for TNS CHILE-TECHNETSECURITY S.AMNT-CL-TCSA68-LACNIC2026-10-29Announced
167.250.197.0/24LACNICLACNIC generated route for TNS CHILE-TECHNETSECURITY S.AMNT-CL-TCSA68-LACNIC2026-10-29Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS267748 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-AMCL-BBNTTCOMLists AS267748 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-10RADBLists AS267748 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS267748 as a direct member
AS-FORTE-TELECOM-CUSTOMER-POCRADBLists AS267748 as a direct member
AS-ITXCHILERADBLists AS267748 as a direct member
AS-STORMWALL-SETRADBLists AS267748 as a direct member
AS-STORMWALL-SETRIPELists AS267748 as a direct member
AS-UFLA-TRANSCUSTRADBLists AS267748 as a direct member
AS265703:AS-AUSTROLACNICLists AS267748 as a direct member
AS40850:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS267748 as a direct member
AS61522:AS-ISPSLACNICLists AS267748 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-29 12:01 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-29. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.