asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS23599 DDNSKR-KR Korea Internet Security Agency

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 1.02K 4 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 3 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KR
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 4 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Korea Internet & Security Agency

Korea, Republic of · AI-generated

government registry infrastructure

DDNSKR-KR is operated by Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA).

What it's used for

  • The address space carries registry infrastructure, evidenced by netnames KRNIC-NET-KR and registrants IRT-KRNIC-KR across all announced IPv4 prefixes.
  • The AS announces 1024 IPv4 addresses across 4 prefixes and 3 IPv6 prefixes, with only 4 observed neighbours, indicating a small, self-contained internal network rather than a transit or access provider.

Notable

  • All RDAP registrants align with the announcer, consistently showing IRT-KRNIC-KR for the four IPv4 blocks.
  • KISA is the sub-organization of the Ministry of Science and ICT responsible for the allocation and maintenance of South Korea's IPv4 and IPv6 address space, with KRNIC operating under its umbrella.
  • The inventory consists of four /24 IPv4 blocks and three /48 IPv6 blocks, all registered to the same KRNIC entity.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
Korea Internet Neutral Exchange KINXSeoul, South Korea139.150.100.90

Transit providers

4 upstream, 0 downstream and 6 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS9318SK Broadband Co Ltd148
AS4766Korea Telecom109
AS9286KINX98
AS9957KINX3

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-19, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 4 prefixes · 1.02K addresses IPv6 3 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KRKorea, Republic of7

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS23599
Registry name
DDNSKR-KR-KR
Abuse contact
hostmaster@nic.or.kr
Registered
2002-12-24
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 7 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS23599
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 7 of 7 announcements
Route objects
13 naming AS23599

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check