Autonomous system
AS212085 BRUEGGUS-AS Alexander Bruegmann
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Alexander Bruegmann
dns privacy individual germany
BRUEGGUS-AS is operated by Alexander Bruegmann.
What it's used for
- The space carries DNS infrastructure, evidenced by the netname
DNSCRY_PTon the sole IPv4 prefix. - The AS announces 256 IPv4 addresses and 35 IPv6 prefixes against 41 observed neighbours, a ratio indicating a transit or peering-heavy role rather than a large access network.
- Traffic from this AS consists of DNS resolution services, specifically privacy-focused DNS endpoints.
Notable
- The registrant Alexander Bruegmann matches the AS holder and the netname registrant.
- The address inventory is minimal, consisting of a single /24 IPv4 block and a set of IPv6 prefixes, consistent with a specialized service provider rather than a general ISP.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 2 exchanges in 2 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Local Internet Exchange Düsseldorf | Düsseldorf, Germany | 185.1.155.125 |
| Ontario Internet Exchange | Toronto, Canada | 149.112.50.148 |
Transit providers
34 upstream, 0 downstream and 42 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 35 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| DE | Germany | 36 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS212085- Registry name
- BRUEGGUS-AS
- Registrant
- brueggus-mnt
- Abuse contact
- abuse@as212085.eu
- Registered
- 2020-12-29
- Last changed
- 2026-08-18
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 83% valid · 54 valid, 11 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 7 authorising AS212085
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 65 of 65 announcements
- Route objects
- 95 naming AS212085
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere