asn.dev

Routing security

AS211024 DEVPLAYER0

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 3 of 3 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 3 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

3 observed

Every prefix observed with AS211024 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0e:97c0:4d0::/48RPKI validIRR30
2a0e:97c0:4d2::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a0e:97c0:4df::/48RPKI validIRR34

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

3 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS211024 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2a0e:97c0:4d0::/48/48RIPENCC
2a0e:97c0:4d2::/48/48RIPENCC
2a0e:97c0:4df::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

4 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLCDeclaredObserved
AS8283Netwerkvereniging ColoclueDeclaredObserved
AS20473The Constant Company, LLCDeclaredObserved
AS34927iFog GmbHDeclaredObserved
AS29632Netassist International EOODnot declaredObserved
AS3333Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC)not declaredObserved
AS24482SG.GSnot declaredObserved
AS48185team.blue NVnot declaredObserved
AS204092Association GRIFONnot declaredObserved
AS205794JINZE YANGnot declaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

5 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS211024 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a0e:97c0:4d0::/44RADBVultr Customer RouteMAINT-AS204732023-12-19Not announced
2a0e:97c0:4da::/48RIPE—DEVPLAYER0-MNT2021-09-27Not announced
2a0e:97c0:4d0::/48RIPE—DEVPLAYER0-MNT2021-07-16Announced
2a0e:97c0:4d2::/48RIPE—DEVPLAYER0-MNT2022-10-06Announced
2a0e:97c0:4df::/48RIPE—DEVPLAYER0-MNT2021-07-16Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS211024 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-4IXPRIPELists AS211024 as a direct member
AS-4IXP-RSRIPELists AS211024 as a direct member
AS-4IXPV6RIPELists AS211024 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS211024 as a direct member
AS-IFOGALTDBLists AS211024 as a direct member
AS-IFOGRIPELists AS211024 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS211024 as a direct member
AS-SAMMRADBLists AS211024 as a direct member
AS-SBIX-RSRIPELists AS211024 as a direct member
AS-SERVACUS01RIPELists AS211024 as a direct member
AS20473:AS-VULTRRADBLists AS211024 as a direct member
AS208431:AS-CUSTOMERSRIPELists AS211024 as a direct member
AS211024:AS-DEVPLAYER0RIPELists AS211024 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-22 12:01 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-22. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.