asn.dev

Routing security

AS201719 TK-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 6 of 6 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 7 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

6 observed

Every prefix observed with AS201719 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
85.92.248.0/24RPKI validIRR56
185.65.120.0/22RPKI validIRR58
185.65.120.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.65.121.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.65.122.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.65.123.0/24RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

7 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS201719 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
85.92.248.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.65.120.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.65.120.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.65.121.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.65.122.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.65.123.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a04:ff80::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

3 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS9119SOFTNET d.o.o.DeclaredObserved
AS9146BH Telecom d.d. SarajevoDeclaredObserved
AS21107Blicnet d.o.o. Banja LukaDeclaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

7 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS201719 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a04:ff80::/29RIPE—TELEKLIK-MNT2026-06-16Not announced
85.92.248.0/24RIPE—BIHNET-DNS2024-11-08Announced
185.65.120.0/22RIPETeleklik-Route185TELEKLIK-MNT2014-12-16Announced
185.65.120.0/24RIPETeleklik-Route120TELEKLIK-MNT2015-11-11Announced
185.65.121.0/24RIPETeleklik-Route121TELEKLIK-MNT2015-11-11Announced
185.65.122.0/24RIPETeleklik-Route122TELEKLIK-MNT2015-11-11Announced
185.65.123.0/24RIPETeleklik-Route123TELEKLIK-MNT2015-11-11Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS201719 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BIHNET-ALLRIPELists AS201719 as a direct member
AS-ELTAKABELRIPELists AS201719 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS201719 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS201719 as a direct member
AS-SOFTNETRIPELists AS201719 as a direct member
AS-TELEKOM-SRPSKERIPELists AS201719 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS201719 as a direct member
AS-TRION-TELRIPELists AS201719 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.