asn.dev

Routing security

AS199775 CONNEXIN-LIMITED

Residential RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 14 of 14 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

14 observed

Every prefix observed with AS199775 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
45.94.32.0/22RPKI validIRR52
185.6.152.0/22RPKI validIRR52
185.42.0.0/23RPKI validIRR covering51
185.42.2.0/23RPKI validIRR covering52
185.65.164.0/22RPKI validIRR52
185.95.108.0/22RPKI validIRR52
185.168.132.0/23RPKI validIRR covering52
185.168.134.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
185.168.135.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
185.182.52.0/23RPKI validIRR covering52
185.182.54.0/23RPKI validIRR covering52
185.208.240.0/22RPKI validIRR52
185.242.218.0/24RPKI validIRR51
194.126.152.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS199775 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
45.94.32.0/22/24RIPENCC
46.36.192.0/21/24RIPENCC
185.6.152.0/22/24RIPENCC
185.42.0.0/22/24RIPENCC
185.65.164.0/22/24RIPENCC
185.95.108.0/22/24RIPENCC
185.168.132.0/22/24RIPENCC
185.182.52.0/22/24RIPENCC
185.208.240.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.242.218.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.126.152.0/22/24RIPENCC
2a05:1c0::/40/40RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

11 objects · 5 not announced

Route objects naming AS199775 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
46.36.192.0/21RIPE—CXN-NOC-MNT2023-10-31Not announced
185.42.0.0/22RIPE—CXN-NOC-MNT2026-08-21Not announced
185.168.132.0/22RIPE—CXN-NOC-MNT2024-04-30Not announced
185.182.52.0/22RIPE—CXN-NOC-MNT2023-10-02Not announced
194.126.152.0/22RIPE—CXN-NOC-MNT2023-10-31Not announced
45.94.32.0/22RIPE—CXN-NOC-MNT2023-10-31Announced
185.6.152.0/22RIPE—CXN-NOC-MNT2017-01-09Announced
185.65.164.0/22RIPE—CXN-NOC-MNT2023-10-31Announced
185.95.108.0/22RIPE—CXN-NOC-MNT2018-12-04Announced
185.208.240.0/22RIPE—CXN-NOC-MNT2023-08-16Announced
185.242.218.0/24RIPE—AB54257-MNT2022-07-29Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS199775 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CONNEXINRIPELists AS199775 as a direct member
AS-LONAP-CONNECTEDRIPELists AS199775 as a direct member
AS-LONAP-MLPRIPELists AS199775 as a direct member
AS-LONAP-MLP-V6RIPELists AS199775 as a direct member
AS-NTLIRIPELists AS199775 as a direct member
AS-VAIONIRIPELists AS199775 as a direct member
AS51202:AS-ALLALTDBLists AS199775 as a direct member
AS57932:AS-IXLEEDS-MLPRIPELists AS199775 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.