asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS16328 UACEG-AS University of Architecture Civil Engineering and Geodesy

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 768 2 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly BG
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

University of Architecture, Civil Engineering and Geodesy

Bulgaria · AI-generated

education research business

Both blocks carry the same netname, so the record cannot tell them apart by name at all.

What it's used for

  • A university network. Two IPv4 prefixes announced from Bulgaria, no IPv6, seven hundred and sixty-eight addresses, through one observed BGP neighbour.

Notable

  • The netname on both blocks is the same five letters, the university's initials, with no country code, no date and no numeral. Most schemes add one of those to keep two blocks distinct; this one does not.
  • The holder field drops the preposition from the university's name, so it reads as four subjects in a row. The registrant field on both blocks puts it back.
  • The AS handle is those same initials, the letters for an autonomous system, and then a city name, so the routing label carries geography the netnames leave out.
  • Three contacts sit on each block: the university, an abuse contact, and an administrative role whose label is an abbreviation cut off after two letters and a hyphen.
  • The two blocks come from unrelated parent ranges, which is normal for a network that grew by asking twice rather than once.
  • Six addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • A university with fewer than a thousand addresses and one upstream is running a campus, not a research backbone. The four disciplines in the name are the whole institution.
  • Reusing one netname across every block is a small decision that costs nothing until someone tries to search the registry for a specific range.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS8717A1 Bulgaria EAD122

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-02, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 2 prefixes · 768 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
BGBulgaria2

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS16328
Registry name
UACEG-AS
Registrant
University of Architecture Civil Engineering and Geodesy
Abuse contact
ddinev_fce@uacg.bg
Registered
2002-05-22
Last changed
2026-01-26
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 2 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
2 authorising AS16328
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
Route objects
2 naming AS16328

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,851 prefixes, as published 2026-11-03. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check