Autonomous system
AS16291 GRUDNIK-KRK-
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Grudnik
business enterprise isp
Brand, city code and country code, and the same three-part string does duty as every label in the record.
What it's used for
- A company's own network. A single IPv4 prefix announced from Poland, no IPv6, two hundred and fifty-six addresses, through two observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- The netname is three parts: the company brand, three letters for the city it operates from, and a two-letter country code. It reads like an airport board and identifies the block precisely.
- The AS handle is built from the same parts, and the holder field opens with the same string before giving the company's legal form, so one label is reused in three places.
- The block is registered to the company and to an abuse role whose label spells out that it handles abuse, in words rather than the usual abbreviation.
- The routing record begins nearly a decade after the number's range was issued, so the number waited before it was used.
- Two upstreams on a single smallest-routable block is redundancy on the smallest possible network.
- Three addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- A three-letter city code inside a netname is doing work no other field does. The registry records a country and a company; the city is the operator's own note about where the equipment actually is.
- Consistency across every field is rarer in this range than any of the collisions, and it means one person wrote all three at the same time from the same template.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-27, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| PL | Poland | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS16291- Registry name
- GRUDNIK-KRK-PL
- Registrant
- GRUDNIK-MNT
- Abuse contact
- admin@rigel.pl
- Registered
- 2009-01-22
- Last changed
- 2018-09-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS16291
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
- Route objects
- 1 naming AS16291
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 446 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere