Autonomous system
AS16286 UOKASHAN
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
University of Kashan
education research infrastructure
A number issued in the registry's early years, holding address space registered more than a decade later.
What it's used for
- A university's campus network. A single IPv4 prefix announced from Iran, no IPv6, one thousand and twenty-four addresses, through two observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- The holder field opens with the institution's name abbreviated to two letters and a place, in mixed case, then writes the same name out in full. The abbreviation and the expansion sit side by side.
- The AS handle is that abbreviation alone, in capitals, which makes it the only field in the record that says nothing about what kind of organisation this is.
- The netname is a country code, the same abbreviation, and a full date. That date is far more recent than the number itself, so the addresses were registered long after the number was set aside.
- The block is registered to the university and an abuse role, with nothing else attached.
- Two upstreams for a thousand addresses is redundancy rather than capacity.
- Three addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- The gap between an early number and late address space is a common shape in this range. Numbers were handed out freely when they seemed plentiful; addresses were rationed, and a university waited for them.
- A campus that publishes no reverse names is not hiding anything. It is a network where the people who need to find a machine already know its name, and everyone else is asking from outside.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-19, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 1.02K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| IR | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS16286- Registry name
- UoKashan
- Registrant
- ir-uokashan-1-mnt
- Abuse contact
- abuse@kashanu.ac.ir
- Registered
- 2015-08-18
- Last changed
- 2018-09-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 4 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 4 authorising AS16286
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 4 of 4 announcements
- Route objects
- 5 naming AS16286
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,778 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere