Autonomous system
AS16045 BULINFO-HOSTING
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Spektar
hosting isp business
Five single blocks from five unrelated ranges, one of them registered to a rival operator's abuse desk.
What it's used for
- A hosting provider. Five IPv4 prefixes announced from Bulgaria, no IPv6, one thousand two hundred and eighty addresses, across nine observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Every block is a single
/24and no two come from the same range, which is what buying address space one piece at a time looks like. - Four netnames use a country code, a different company's brand, and a date, and are registered to that company under two spellings plus an abuse role.
- The fifth is named after the holder and lists exactly one contact: the abuse desk of a large national operator, with neither the holder nor the other company on it.
- Two of the four dated blocks share one date; the others are three and thirteen years later.
- The AS handle is the other company's brand and the word for hosting, not the holder's name.
- Fifteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- The holder appears only in the routing record and in one netname. Everywhere else the record belongs to the business that was bought, which is the usual outcome when a hosting company changes hands: the customers and the addresses move, and the paperwork does not.
- Scattered single blocks with different registrations are harder to filter and harder to trace, which is a side effect rather than a motive, but it is why address history is worth reading.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Bulgarian Internet eXchange | Sofia, Bulgaria | 193.169.198.119 |
Transit providers
5 upstream, 0 downstream and 5 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 5 prefixes · 1.28K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| BG | Bulgaria | 5 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS16045- Registry name
- BULINFO-HOSTING
- Registrant
- AS13124-MNT
- Abuse contact
- ripe.abuse@a1.bg
- Registered
- 2007-03-15
- Last changed
- 2025-05-13
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 5 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 5 authorising AS16045
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 5 of 5 announcements
- Route objects
- 5 naming AS16045
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere